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Abstract
Given the sensitive nature of health data, security and privacy in e-health systems is of prime
importance. It is crucial that an e-health system must ensure that users remain private –
even if they are bribed or coerced to reveal themselves, or others: a pharmaceutical company
could, for example, bribe a pharmacist to reveal information which breaks a doctor’s privacy.
In this paper, we first identify and formalise several new but important privacy properties
on enforcing doctor privacy. Then we analyse the security and privacy of a complicated and
practical e-health protocol (DLV08). Our analysis uncovers ambiguities in the protocol, and
shows to what extent these new privacy properties as well as other security properties (such
as secrecy and authentication) and privacy properties (such as anonymity and untraceability)
are satisfied by the protocol. Finally, we address the found ambiguities which result in both
security and privacy flaws, and propose suggestions for fixing them.
Keyword: E-health systems, formal verification, applied pi, secrecy, authentication, anonymity,
privacy, enforced privacy, untraceability
1 Introduction
The inefficiency of traditional paper-based health care and advances in information and com-
munication technologies, in particular cloud computing, mobile, and satellite communications,
constitute the ideal environment to facilitate the development of widespread electronic health care
(e-health for short) systems. E-health systems are distributed health care systems using devices
and computers which communicate with each other, typically via the Internet. E-health systems
aim to support secure sharing of information and resources across different health care settings
and workflows among different health care providers. The services of such systems are intended
to be more secure, effective, efficient and timely than the currently existing health care systems.
Given the sensitive nature of health data, handling this data must meet strict security and
privacy requirements. In traditional health care systems, this is normally implemented by control-
ling access to the physical documents that contain the health care data. Security and privacy are
then satisfied, assuming only legitimate access is possible and assuming that those with access do
not violate security or privacy.
However, the introduction of e-health systems upends this approach. The main benefit of e-
health systems is that they facilitate digital exchange of information amongst the various parties
involved. This has two major consequences: first, the original health care data is shared digitally
with more parties, such as pharmacists and insurance companies; and second, this data can be
easily shared by any of those parties with an outsider. Clearly, the assumption of a trusted
network can no longer hold in such a setting. Given that it is trivial for a malicious entity to
∗Supported by a grant from the Fonds National de la Recherche (Luxembourg).
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intercept or even alter digital data in transit, access control approaches to security and privacy
are no longer sufficient. Therefore, we must consider security and privacy of the involved parties
with respect to an outsider, the Dolev-Yao adversary [DY83], who controls the communication
network (i.e., the adversary can observe, block, create and alter information). Communication
security against such an adversary is mainly achieved by employing cryptographic communication
protocols. Cryptography is also employed to preserve and enforce privacy, which prevents problems
such as prescription bribery.
It is well known that designing such protocols is error-prone: time and again, flaws have been
found in protocols that claimed to be secure (e.g., electronic voting systems [BT94, LK00] have
been broken [HS00, LK02]). Therefore, we must require that security and privacy claims of an
e-health protocol are verified before the protocol is used in practice. Without verifying that a
protocol satisfies its security and privacy claims, subtle flaws may go undiscovered.
In order to objectively verify whether a protocol satisfies its claimed security and privacy re-
quirements, each requirement must be formally defined as a property. Various security and privacy
properties have already been defined in the literature, such as secrecy, authentication, anonymity
and untraceability. We refer to these properties as regular security and privacy properties. While
they are necessary to ensure security and privacy, by themselves these regular properties are not
sufficient. Benaloh and Tuinstra pointed out the risk of subverting a voter [BT94] to sell her
vote. The idea of coercing or bribing a party into nullifying their privacy is hardly considered in
the literature of e-health systems (notable exceptions include [Mat98, dDLVV08]). However, this
concept impacts e-health privacy: for example, a pharmaceutical company could bribe doctors
to prescribe only their medicine. Therefore, we cannot only consider privacy with respect to the
Dolev-Yao adversary. To fully evaluate privacy of e-health systems, we must also consider this
new aspect of privacy in the presence of an active coercer – someone who is bribing or threat-
ening parties to reveal private information. We refer to this new class of privacy properties as
enforced privacy properties. In particular, we identify the following regular and enforced privacy
properties [DJP12b] to counter doctor bribery: prescription privacy: a doctor cannot be linked
to his prescriptions; receipt-freeness : a doctor cannot prove his prescriptions to the adversary
for preventing doctor bribes; independency of prescription privacy: third parties cannot help the
adversary to link a doctor to the doctor’s prescriptions for preventing others to reduce a doc-
tor’s prescription privacy; and independency of receipt-freeness : a doctor and third parties cannot
prove the doctor’s prescriptions to the adversary for preventing anyone from affecting a doctor’s
receipt-freeness.
Contributions. We identify three enforced privacy properties in e-health systems and are the
first to provide formal definitions for them. In addition, we develop an in-depth applied pi model
of the DLV08 e-health protocol [dDLVV08]. As this protocol was designed for practical use in
Belgium, it needed to integrate with the existing health care system. As such, it has become a
complicated system with many involved parties, that relies on complex cryptographic primitives to
achieve a multitude of goals. We formally analyse privacy and enforced privacy properties of the
protocol, as well as regular security properties. We identify ambiguities in the protocol description
that cause both security and privacy flaws, and propose suggestions for fixing them. The ProVerif
code of modelling and full analysis of the DLV08 protocol can be found in [DJP12a].
Remark. This article is a revised and extended version of [DJP12b] that appears in the pro-
ceedings of the 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS’12). In
this version we have added (1) the full formal modelling of the DLV08 protocol in the applied
pi calculus (see Section 5); (2) the detailed analysis of secrecy and authentication properties of
the protocol (see Section 6); and (3) details of the analysis of privacy properties of the protocol
which are not described in the conference paper [DJP12b] (see Section 6). In addition, it contains
an overview on privacy and enforced privacy in e-health systems (see Section 2) and a brief but
complete description of the applied pi calculus (see Section 3.1).
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2 Privacy and enforced privacy in e-health
Ensuring privacy in e-health systems has been recognised as a necessary prerequisite for adoption
such systems by the general public [MRS06, KAB09]. However, due to the complexity of e-health
settings, existing privacy control techniques, e.g., formal privacy methods, from domains such as
e-voting (e.g., [DKR09, JPM09]) and e-auctions (e.g., [DJP11]) do not carry over directly. In
e-voting and e-auctions, there is a natural division into two types of roles: participants (voters,
bidders) and authorities (who run the election/auction). In contrast, e-health systems have to deal
with a far more complex constellation of roles, including doctors, patients, pharmacists, insurance
agencies, oversight bodies, etc. These roles interact in various ways with each other, requiring
private data of one another, which makes privacy even more complex.
Depending on the level of digitalisation, health care systems have different security require-
ments. If electronic devices are only used to store patient records, then ensuring privacy mainly
requires local access control. On the other hand, if data is communicated over a network, then
communication privacy becomes paramount. Below, we sketch a typical situation of using a health
care system, indicating what information is necessary where. This will help to gain an understand-
ing for the interactions and interdependencies between the various roles.
Typically, a patient is examined by a doctor, who then prescribes medicine. The patient goes
to a pharmacist to get the medicine. The medicine is reimbursed by the patient’s health insurance,
and the symptoms and prescription of the patient may be logged with a medical research facility
to help future research.
This overview hides many details. The patient may possess medical devices enabling her to
undergo the examination at home, after which the devices digitally communicate their findings
to a remote doctor. The findings of any examination (by doctor visit or by digital devices) need
to be stored in the patients health record, either electronic or on paper, which may be stored
at the doctor’s office, on a server in the network, on a device carried by the patient, or any
combination of these. Next, the doctor returns a prescription, which also needs to be stored.
The pharmacist needs to know what medicine is required, which is privacy-sensitive information.
Moreover, to prevent abuse of medicine, the pharmacist must verify that the prescription came
from an authorised doctor, is intended for this patient, and was not fulfilled before. On top of that,
the pharmacist may be allowed (or even required) to substitute medicine of one type for another
(e.g., brand medicine for generic equivalents), which again must be recorded in the patient’s
health record. For reimbursement, the pharmacist or the patient registers the transaction with
the patient’s health insurer. In addition, regulations may require that such information is stored
(in aggregated form or directly) for future research or logged with government agencies. Some
health care systems allow emergency access to health data, which complicates privacy matters
even further. Finally, although a role may need to have access to privacy-sensitive data of other
roles, this does not mean that he is trusted to ensure the privacy of those other roles. For instance,
a pharmacist may sell his knowledge about prescription behaviour to a pharmaceutical company.
From the above overview on e-health systems, we can conclude that existing approaches to
ensuring privacy from other domains deal with far simpler division of roles, and they are not
properly equipped to handle the role diversity present in e-health systems. Moreover, they do
not address the influence of other roles on an individual’s privacy. Therefore, current privacy
approaches cannot be lifted directly, but must be redesigned specifically for the e-health domain.
In the following discussions, we focus on the privacy of the main actors in health care: patient
privacy and doctor privacy. Privacy of roles such as pharmacists does not impact on the core
process in health care, and is therefore relegated to future work. We do not consider privacy of
roles performed by public entities such as insurance companies, medical administrations, etc.
2.1 Related work
The importance of patient privacy in e-health is traditionally seen as vital to establishing a good
doctor-patient relationship. This is even more pertinent with the emergence of the Electronic
Patient Record [And96]. A necessary early stage of e-health is to transform the paper-based
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health care process into a digital process. The most important changes in this stage are made
to patient information processing, mainly health care records. Privacy policies are the de facto
standard to properly express privacy requirements for such patient records. There are three main
approaches to implement these requirements: access control, architectural design, and the use of
cryptography.
Patient privacy by access control. The most obvious way to preserve privacy of electronic
health care records is to limit access to these records. The need for access control is supported
by several privacy threats to personal health information listed by Anderson [And96]. Controlling
access is not as straightforward as it sounds though: the need for access changes dynamically (e.g.,
a doctor only needs access to records of patients that he is currently treating). Consequently, there
exists a wide variety of access control approaches designed for patient privacy in the literature,
from simple access rules (e.g., [And96]), to consent-based access rules (e.g., [Lou98]), role-based
access control (RBAC) (e.g., [RCHS03]), organisation based access control (e.g., [KBM+03]), etc.
Patient privacy by architectural design. E-health systems cater to a number of differ-
ent roles, including doctors, patients, pharmacists, insurers, etc. Each such role has its own
sub-systems or components. As such, e-health systems can be considered as a large network of
systems, including administrative system components, laboratory information systems, radiology
information systems, pharmacy information systems, and financial management systems. Diligent
architectural design is an essential step to make such a complex system function correctly. Since
privacy is important in e-health systems, keeping privacy in mind when designing the architecture
of such systems is a promising path towards ensuring privacy [SV09]. Examples of how to embed
privacy constraints in the architecture are given by the architecture of wireless sensor networks in
e-health [KLS+10], proxies that may learn location but not patient ID [MKDH09], an architecture
for cross-institution image sharing in e-health [CHCK07], etc.
Cryptographic approaches to patient privacy. Cryptography is necessary to ensure private
communication between system components over public channels (e.g., [BB96]). For example, Van
der Haak et al. [vWB+03] use digital signatures and public-key authentication (for access con-
trol) to satisfy legal requirements for cross-institutional exchange of electronic patient records.
Ateniese et al. [ACdD03] use pseudonyms to preserve patient anonymity, and enable a user to
transform statements concerning one of his pseudonyms into statements concerning one of his
other pseudonyms (e.g., transforming a prescription for the pseudonym used with his doctor to
a prescription for the pseudonym used with the pharmacist). Layouni et al. [LVS+09] consider
communication between health monitoring equipment at a patient’s home and the health care
centre. They propose a protocol using wallet-based credentials (a cryptographic primitive) to
let patients control when and how much identifying information is revealed by the monitoring
equipment. More recently, De Decker et al. [dDLVV08] propose a health care system for commu-
nication between insurance companies and administrative bodies as well as patients, doctors and
pharmacists. Their system relies on various cryptographic primitives to ensure privacy, including
zero-knowledge proofs, signed proofs of knowledge, and bit-commitments. We will explain this
system in more detail in Section 4.
Doctor privacy. A relatively understudied aspect is that of doctor privacy. Matya´sˇ [Mat98]
investigates the problem of enabling analysis of prescription information while ensuring doctor
privacy. His approach is to group doctors, and release the data per group, hiding who is in the
group. He does not motivate a need for doctor privacy, however. Two primary reasons for doctor
privacy have been identified in the literature: (1) (Ateniese et al. [ACdD03]) to safeguard doctors
against administrators setting specific efficiency metrics on their performance (e.g., requiring the
cheapest medicine be used, irrespective of the patient’s needs). To address this, Ateniese et
al. [Ad02, ACdD03] propose an anonymous prescription system that uses group signatures to
achieve privacy for doctors; (2) (De Decker et al. [dDLVV08]) to prevent a pharmaceutical company
4
from bribing a doctor to prescribe their medicine. A typical scenario can be described as follows.
A pharmaceutical company seeks to persuade a doctor to favour a certain kind of medicine by
bribing or coercing. To prevent this, a doctor should not be able to prove which medicine he is
prescribing to this company (in general, to the adversary). This implies that doctor privacy must
be enforced by e-health systems. De Decker et al. also note that preserving doctor privacy is
not sufficient to prevent bribery: pharmacists could act as intermediaries, revealing the doctor’s
identity to the briber, as pharmacists often have access to prescriptions, and thus know something
about the prescription behaviour of a doctor. This observation leads us to formulate a new but
important requirement of independency of prescription privacy in this paper: no third party should
be able to help the adversary link a doctor to his prescription.
2.2 Observations
Current approaches to privacy in e-health, as witnessed from the literature study in Section 2.1,
mostly focus on patient privacy as an access control or authentication problem. Even though
doctor privacy is also a necessity, research into ensuring doctor privacy is still in its infancy. We
believe that doctor privacy is as important as patient privacy and needs to be studied in more
depth. It is also clear from the analysis that privacy in e-health systems needs to be addressed at
different layers: access control ensures privacy at the service layer; privacy by architecture design
addresses privacy concerns at the system/architecture layer; use of cryptography guarantees pri-
vacy at the communication layer. Since e-health systems are complex [TGC09] and rely on correct
communications between many sub-systems, we study privacy in e-health as a communication
problem. In fact, message exchanges in communication protocols may leak information which
leads to a privacy breach [Low96, CKS04, DKR09].
Classical privacy properties, which are well-studied in the literature, attempt to ensure that
privacy can be enabled. However, merely enabling privacy is insufficient in many cases: for such
cases, a system must enforce user privacy instead of allowing the user to pursue it. One example
is doctor bribery. To avoid doctor bribery, we take into account enforced privacy for doctors. In
addition, we consider that one party’s privacy may depend on another party (e.g., in the case of a
pharmacist revealing prescription behaviour of a doctor). In these cases, others can cause (some)
loss of privacy. Obviously, ensuring privacy in such a case requires more from the system than
merely enabling privacy. Consequently, we propose and study the following privacy properties for
doctors in communication protocols in the e-health domain, in addition to regular security and
privacy properties as we mentioned before in Section 1.
prescription privacy: A protocol preserves prescription privacy if the adversary cannot link a
doctor to his prescriptions.
receipt-freeness: A protocol satisfies receipt-freeness if a doctor cannot prove his prescriptions
to the adversary.
independency of prescription privacy: A protocol ensures independency of prescription pri-
vacy if third parties cannot help the adversary to link a doctor to the doctor’s prescriptions.
independency of receipt-freeness: A protocol ensures independency of receipt-freeness if a
doctor cannot prove his prescriptions to the adversary given that third parties sharing in-
formation with the adversary.
3 Formalisation of privacy properties
In order to formally verify properties of a protocol, the protocol itself as well as the properties need
to be formalised. In this section, we focus on the formalisation of key privacy properties, while
the formalisation of secrecy and authentication properties can be considered standard as studied
in the literature [Low96, Bla01]. Thus secrecy and authentication properties are introduced later
in the case study (Section 6.1) and are omitted in this section.
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We choose the formalism of the applied pi calculus, due to its capability in expressing equiv-
alence based properties which is essential for privacy, and automatic verification supported by
the tool ProVerif [Bla01]. The applied pi calculus is introduced in Section 3.1. Next, in Sec-
tion 3.2, we show how to model e-health protocols in the applied pi calculus. Then, from
Section 3.4 to Section 3.7, we formalise each of the privacy properties described in the end of
Section 2.2. Finally, in Sections 3.8 and 3.9, we consider (strong) anonymity and (strong) un-
traceability in e-health, respectively. These concepts have been formally studied in other domains
(e.g., [SS96, vMR08, BHM08, KT09, ACRR10, KTV10]), and thus are only briefly introduced in
this section.
3.1 The applied pi calculus
The applied pi calculus is a language for modelling and analysing concurrent systems, in particular
cryptographic protocols. The following (mainly based on [AF01, RS10]) briefly introduces its
syntax, semantics and equivalence relations.
3.1.1 Syntax
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, which are used to model communication channels
and other atomic data, an infinite set of variables, which are used to model received messages, and
a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols, which are used to model cryptographic
primitives. Each function symbol has an arity. A function symbol with arity zero is a constant.
Terms (which are used to model messages) are defined as names, variables, or function symbols
applied to terms (see Figure 1).
M,N, T ::= terms
a, b, c, m, n, . . . names
x, y, z variables
f(M1, . . . ,Mℓ) function application
Figure 1: Terms in the applied pi calculus.
Example 1 (function symbols and terms). Typical function symbols are enc with arity 2 for
encryption, dec with arity 2 for decryption. The term for encrypting x with a key k is enc(x, k).
The applied pi calculus assumes a sort system for terms. Terms can be of a base type (e.g.,
Key or a universal base type Data) or type Channel〈ω〉 where ω is a type. A variable and a name
can have any type. A function symbol can only be applied to, and return, terms of base type.
Terms are assumed to be well-sorted and substitutions preserve types.
Terms are often equipped with an equational theory E – a set of equations on terms. The
equational theory is normally used to capture features of cryptographic primitives. The equivalence
relation induced by E is denoted as =E.
Example 2 (equational theory). The behaviour of symmetric encryption and decryption can be
captured by the following equation:
dec(enc(x, k), k) =E x,
where x and k are variables.
Systems are described as processes: plain processes and extended processes (see Figure 2). In
Figure 2, M,N are terms, n is a name, x is a variable and v is a metavariable, standing either for
a name or a variable. The null process 0 does nothing. The parallel composition P | Q represents
the sub-process P and the sub-process Q running in parallel. The replication !P represents an
infinite number of process P running in parallel. The name restriction νn.P binds the name n
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P,Q,R ::= plain processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction
if M =E N then P else Q conditional
in(v, x).P message input
out(v,M).P message output
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
Figure 2: Processes in the applied pi calculus.
in the process P , which means the name n is secret to the adversary. The conditional evaluation
M =E N represents equality over the equational theory rather than strict syntactic identity. The
message input in(v, x).P reads a message from channel v, and binds the message to the variable
x in the following process P . The message output out(v,M).P sends the message M on the
channel v, and then runs the process P . In both of these cases we may omit P when it is 0.
Extended processes add variable restrictions and active substitutions. The variable restriction
νx.A binds the variable x in the process A. The active substitution {M/x} replaces variable x
with term M in any process that it contacts with. We say a process is sequential if it does not
involve using the parallel composition P | Q, replication !P , conditional, or active substitution.
That is, a sequential process is either null or constructed using name/variable restriction, message
input/output. In addition, applying syntactical substitution (i.e., “let x = N in” in ProVerif
input language) to a sequential process still results in a sequential process. For simplicity of
presentation, we use νa˜ as an abbreviation for νa1.νa2. · · · .νan, where a˜ is the sequence of names
a1, a2, · · · , an. We also use the abbreviation P.Q to represent the process action1. · · · .actionn.Q,
where P := action1. · · · .actionn; and an action i is of the form νn, νx, in(v, x), out(v,M) or
let x = N in actionj . The intuition of P.Q is that when a process consists of a sequential sub-
process P followed by a sub-process Q, we write the process in an abbreviated manner as P.Q. In
addition, we use the abbreviation {M1/x1, · · · ,Mn/xn} to represent {M1/x1} · · · {Mn/xn}.
Names and variables have scopes. A name is bound if it is under restriction. A variable is bound
by restrictions or inputs. Names and variables are free if they are not delimited by restrictions or
by inputs. The sets of free names, free variables, bound names and bound variables of a process
A are denoted as fn(A), fv(A), bn(A) and bv(A), respectively. A term is ground when it does not
contain variables. A process is closed if it does not contain free variables.
Example 3 (processes). Consider a protocol in which A generates a nonce m, encrypts the nonce
with a secret key k, then sends the encrypted message to B. Denote with QA the process modelling
the behaviour of A, with QB the process modelling the behaviour of B, and the whole protocol by
Q:
QA := νm.out(ch, enc(m, k))
QB := in(ch, x)
Q := νk.(QA | QB)
Here, ch is a free name representing a public channel. Name k is bound in process Q; name m is
bound in process QA. Variable x is bound in process QB.
A frame is defined as an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel
composition and restrictions. The active substitutions in extended processes allow us to map an
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extended process A to its frame frame(A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0. The
domain of a frame B, denoted as domain(B), is the set of variables for which the frame defines a
substitution and which are not under a restriction.
Example 4 (frames). The frame of the process νm.(out(ch, x) | {m/x}), denoted as frame(νm.
(out(ch, x) | {m/x})) is νm.(0 | {m/x}). The domain of this frame, denoted as domain(νm.(0 |
{m/x})) is {x}.
A context C[ ] is defined as a process with a hole, which may be filled with any process. An
evaluation context is a context whose hole is not under a replication, a condition, an input or an
output.
Example 5 (context). Process νk.(QA | ) is an evaluation context. When we fill the hole with
process QB, we obtain the process νk.(QA | QB), which is the process Q.
3.1.2 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of the applied pi calculus is defined by: 1) structural equivalence (≡),
2) internal reduction (→), and 3) labelled reduction ( α−→) of processes.
1) Intuitively, two processes are structurally equivalent if they model the same thing but differ
in structure. Formally, structural equivalence of processes is the smallest equivalence relation
on extended process that is closed by α-conversion on names and variables, by application of
evaluation contexts as shown in Figure 3.
PAR− 0 A | 0 ≡ A
PAR− A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
PAR− C A | B ≡ B | A
REPL !P ≡ P | !P
SUBST {M/x} | A ≡ {M/x} | A{M/x}
NEW− 0 νu.0 ≡ 0
NEW− C νu.νv.A ≡ νv.νu.A
NEW− PAR A | νv.B ≡ νv.(A | B) if v 6∈ fn(A) ∪ fv(A)
ALIAS νx.{M/x} ≡ 0
REWRITE {M/x} ≡ {N/x} if M =E N
Figure 3: Structural equivalence in the applied pi calculus.
2) Internal reduction is the smallest relation on extended processes closed under structural
equivalence, application of evaluation of contexts as shown in Figure 4.
COMM out(c, x).P | in(c, x).Q → P | Q
THEN if N =E N then P else Q → P
ELSE if M =E N then P else Q → Q
for ground terms M,N where M 6=E N
Figure 4: Internal reduction in the applied pi calculus.
3) The labelled reduction models the environment interacting with the processes. It defines
a relation A
α−→ A′ as in Figure 5. The label α is either reading a term from the process’s
environment, or sending a name or a variable of base type to the environment.
3.1.3 Equivalences
The applied pi calculus defines observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity to model the
indistinguishability of two processes by the adversary. It is proved that the two relations coincide,
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IN in(c, x).P
in(c,M)−−−−−→ P{M/x}
OUT− ATOM out(c, v).P out(c,v)−−−−−→ P
OPEN− ATOM A
out(c,v)−−−−−→ A′ v 6= c
νv.A
νv.out(c,v)−−−−−−−→ A′
SCOPE
A
α−→ A′ v does not occur in α
νv.A
α−→ νv.A′
PAR
A
α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A | B α−→ A′ | B
STRUCT
A ≡ B B α−→ B′ A′ ≡ B′
A
α−→ A′
Figure 5: Labelled reduction in the applied pi calculus.
when active substitutions are of base type [AF01, Liu11]. We mainly use the labelled bisimilarity
for the convenience of proofs. Labelled bisimilarity is based on static equivalence: labelled bisimi-
larity compares the dynamic behaviour of processes, while static equivalence compares their static
states (as represented by their frames).
Definition 1 (static equivalence). Two terms M and N are equal in the frame B, written as
(M =E N)B, iff there exists a set of restricted names n˜ and a substitution σ such that B ≡ νn˜.σ,
Mσ =E Nσ and n˜ ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅.
Closed frames B and B′ are statically equivalent, denoted as B ≈s B′, if
(1) domain(B) = domain(B′);
(2) ∀ terms M,N : (M =E N)B iff (M =E N)B′.
Extended processes A, A′ are statically equivalent, denoted as A ≈s A′, if their frames are
statically equivalent: frame(A) ≈s frame(A′).
Example 6 (equivalence of frames [AF01]). The frame B and the frame B′, are equivalent.
However, the two frames are not equivalent to frame B′′, because the adversary can discriminate
B′′ by testing y =E f(x).
B := νM.{M/x} | νN.{N/y}
B′ := νM.({f(M)/x} | {g(M)/y})
B′′ := νM.({M/x} | {f(M)/y})
where f and g are two function symbols without equations.
Example 7 (static equivalence). Process {M/x} | Q1 is statically equivalent to process {M/x} |
Q2 where Q1 and Q2 are two closed plain process, because the frame of the two processes are
statically equivalent, i.e., {M/x} ≈s {M/x}.
Definition 2 (labelled bisimilarity). Labelled bisimilarity (≈ℓ) is the largest symmetric relation
R on closed extended processes, such that ARB implies:
(1) A ≈s B;
(2) if A→ A′ then B →∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′;
(3) if A
α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ domain(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅; then B →∗ α−→→∗ B′ and A′RB′
for some B′, where * denotes zero or more.
3.2 E-health protocols
In the existing e-voting and (sealed bid) e-auction protocols, where bribery and coercion have
been formally analysed using the applied pi calculus (see e.g., [DKR09, DJP11]), the number of
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participants is determined a priori. In contrast with these protocols, e-health systems should be
able to handle newly introduced participants (e.g., patients). To this end, we model user-types
and each user-type can be instantiated infinite times.
Roles. An e-health protocol can be specified by a set of roles, each of which is modelled as a
process, P1, . . . ,Pn. Each role specifies the behaviour of the user taking this role in an execution
of the protocol. By instantiating the free variables in a role process, we obtain the process of a
specific user taking the role.
Users. Users taking a role can be modelled by adding settings (identity, pseudonym, encryption
key, etc.) to the process representing the role, that is init i.Pi, where init i is a sequential process
which generates names/terms modelling the data of the user (e.g., ‘νskph .let pkph = pk(skph )’
in Figure 26), reads in setting data from channels (e.g., ‘in(chhp, Hii)’ in Figure 25), or reveals
data to the adversary (e.g., ‘out(ch, pkph )’ in Figure 26). A user taking a role multiple times is
captured by add replication to the role process, i.e., init i.!Pi. A user may also take multiple roles.
When the user uses two different settings in different roles, the user is treated as two separate
users. If the user uses shared setting in multiple roles, the user process is modelled as the user
setting sub-process followed by the multiple role processes in parallel, e.g., initk.!(Pi | Pj) when
the user takes two roles Pi and Pj ,.
User-types. Users taking a specific role, potentially multiple times, belong to a user-type.
Hence, a user-type is modelled as Ri := init i.!Pi. The set of users of a type is captured by
adding replication to the user-type process, i.e., !Ri. A protocol with n roles naturally forms n
user-types. In protocols where users are allowed to take multiple roles with one setting, we con-
sider these users form a new type. For example, a challenge-response protocol, which specifies two
roles – a role Initiator and a role Responder, has three user-types - the Initiator, the Responder
and users taking both Initiator and Responder, assuming that a user taking both roles with the
same setting is allowed. A user-type with multiple roles is modelled as initk.!(Pi | . . . | Pj), where
Pi, . . . ,Pj are the roles that a user of this type takes at the same time. Since each user is an
instance of a user-type, the formalisation of user-types allows us to model an unbounded number
of users, by simply adding replication to the user-types. In fact, in most cases, roles and user-types
are identical, and the user-types that allow a user to take multiple roles can be considered as a
new role as well. Hence, we use roles and user-types interchangeably.
Protocol instances. Instances of an e-health protocol Peh with n roles/user-types are modelled
in the following form:
Peh := νm˜c.init .(!R1 | . . . |!Rn),
where process νm˜c, which is the abbreviation for process νa1. . . . .νan.νc1. . . . .νcn (ai stands for
private names, and ci stands for private channels), models the private names and channels in
the protocol; init is a sequential process, representing settings of the protocol, such as gener-
ating/computing data and revealing information to the adversary (see Figure 23 for example).
Essentially, νm˜c.init models the global settings of an instance and auxiliary channels in the mod-
elling of the protocol.
Doctor role/user-type. More specifically, we have a doctor role/user-type Rdr of the form:
Rdr :=
{
νIddr .initdr .!Pdr , if doctor identity is not revealed by setting
νIddr .out(ch, Iddr ).initdr .!Pdr , if doctor identity is revealed by setting
Pdr := νpresc.maindr .
In the following, we focus on the behaviour of a doctor, since our goal is to formalise privacy
properties for doctors. Each doctor is associated with an identity (νIddr ) and can execute an
infinite number of sessions (modelled by the exclamation mark ‘!’ in front of Pdr ). In case the
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doctor identity is revealed in the initialisation phase, we require that this unveiling does not
appear in process initdr , for the sake of uniformed formalisations of the later defined privacy
properties. Instead, we model this case as identity generation (νIddr ) immediately followed by
unveiling the identity (out(ch, Iddr )) on the public channel ch. Note that we reserve the name ch
for the adversary’s public channel. We require ch to be free to model the public channel that is
controlled by the adversary. The adversary uses this channel by sending and receiving messages
over ch. In fact, since the doctor identity Iddr is defined outside of the process initdr .!Pdr , the
doctor identity appearing in the process is a free variable of the process. Hence, in the case that
the doctor identity is revealed, the doctor process can be simply modelled as Rdr := initdr .!Pdr ,
where doctor identity is a free variable. To distinguish the free variable in process initdr .!Pdr from
the name Iddr , we use the italic font to represent the free variable, i.e., Iddr .
Within each session, the doctor creates a prescription. Since a prescription normally contains
not only prescribed medicines but also the time/date that the prescription is generated as well as
other identification information, we consider the prescriptions differ in sessions. In the case that
a prescription can be prescribed multiple times, one can add the replication mark ! in front of
maindr to model that the prescription presc can be prescribed in infinite sessions, i.e., Pdr :=
νpresc.!maindr . Similarly, we use the italic font of the prescription, presc, to represent the free
variable referring to the prescription in the process maindr .
Well-formed. We require that Peh is well-formed, i.e., the process Peh satisfies the following
properties:
1. Peh is canonical: names and variables in the process never appear both bound and free, and
each name and variable is bound at most once;
2. data is typed, channels are ground, private channels are never sent on any channel;
3. νm˜c may be null;
4. init and initdr are sequential processes;
5. init , initdr andmaindr can be any process (possibly 0) such that Peh is a closed plain process.
Furthermore, we use Ceh [ ] to denote a context (a process with a hole) consisting of honest users,
Ceh [ ] := νm˜c.init .(!R1 | . . . |!Rn | ).
Dishonest agents are captured by the adversary (Section 3.3) with certain initial knowledge.
3.3 The adversary
We consider security and privacy properties of e-health protocols with respect to the presence of
active attackers – the Dolev-Yao adversary. The adversary
• controls the network – the adversary can block, read and insert messages over the network;
• has computational power – the adversary can record messages and apply cryptographic
functions to messages to obtain new messages;
• has a set of initial knowledge – the adversary knows the participants and public information
of all participants, as well as a set of his own data;
• has the ability to initiate conversations – the adversary can take part in executions of pro-
tocols.
• The adversary’s behaviour models that of every dishonest agent (cf. Section 6.9), which is
achieved by including the initial knowledge of each dishonest agent in the adversary’s initial
knowledge.
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The behaviour of the adversary is modelled as a process running in parallel with the honest agents.
The adversary does whatever he can to break the security and privacy requirements. We do not
need to model the adversary explicitly, since he is embedded in the applied pi calculus as well as
in the verification tool. Modelling the honest users’ behaviour is sufficient to verify whether the
requirements hold.
Limitations. Note that the Dolev-Yao adversary model we use includes the “perfect cryptogra-
phy” assumption. This means that the adversary cannot infer any information from cryptographic
messages for which he does not possess a key. For instance, the attacker cannot decrypt a ciphertext
without the correct key. Moreover, the adversary does not have the ability to perform side-channel
attacks. For instance, fingerprinting a doctor based on his prescriptions is beyond the scope of
this attacker model.
3.4 Prescription privacy
Prescription privacy ensures unlinkability of a doctor and his prescriptions, i.e., the adversary
cannot tell whether a prescription is prescribed by a doctor. This requirement helps to prevent
doctors from being influenced in the prescriptions they issue.
Normally, prescriptions are eventually revealed to the general public, for example, for research
purposes. In the DLV08 e-health protocol, prescriptions are revealed to the adversary observing
the network. Therefore, in the extreme situation where there is only one doctor, the doctor’s
prescriptions are obviously revealed to the adversary - all the observed prescriptions belong to the
doctor. To avoid such a case, prescription privacy requires at least one other doctor (referred to as
the counter-balancing doctor). This ensures that the adversary cannot tell whether the observed
prescriptions belong to the targetted doctor or the counter-balancing doctor. With this in mind,
unlinkability of a doctor to a prescription is modelled as indistinguishability between two honest
users that swap their prescriptions, analogously to the formalisation of vote-privacy [DKR09]. By
adopting the vote-privacy formalisation, prescription privacy is thus modelled as the equivalence
of two doctor processes: in the first process, an honest doctor dA prescribes pA in one of his sessions
and another honest doctor dB prescribes pB in one of his sessions; in the second one, dA prescribes
pB and dB prescribes pA.
Definition 3 (prescription privacy). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor role Rdr ,
satisfies prescription privacy if for all possible doctors dA and dB (dA 6= dB) we have
Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
],
where pA and pB (pA 6= pB) are any two possible prescriptions, process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and process
!Pdr{dB/Iddr} can be 0.
Process initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc}) models an instance of a
doctor, with identity dA. The sub-process maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc}) models a prescribing session
in which dA prescribes pA for a patient. The sub-process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} models other prescribing
sessions of dA. Similarly, process initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
models another doctor dB. On the right-hand side of the equivalence, the two doctors, dA and dB,
swap their prescriptions, pA and pB. The labelled bisimilarity (≈ℓ) captures that any dishonest third
party (the adversary) cannot distinguish the two sides. Doctor dB’s process is called the counter-
balancing process. We require the existence of the counter-balancing doctor dB and pA 6= pB to
avoid the situation in which all patients prescribe the same prescription, and thus the prescription
of all patients are simply revealed.
Note that Iddr and presc are free names in the processes in the definition. dA and dB are free
names in the processes, when the doctor identities are initially public, and are private names in
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the processes, when the doctor identities are initially private. Similarly, pA and pB are free names
in the processes, when the prescriptions are revealed, and are private names in the processes, when
the prescriptions are kept secret. This holds for the following definitions as well.
3.5 Receipt-freeness
Enforced privacy properties have been formally defined in e-voting and e-auctions. Examples
include receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in e-voting [DKR09, JPM09], and receipt-freeness
for non-winning bidders in e-auctions [DJP11]. De Decker et al. [dDLVV08] identify the need
to prevent a pharmaceutical company from bribing a doctor to favour their medicine. Hence, a
doctor’s prescription privacy must be enforced by the e-health system to prevent doctor bribery.
This means that intuitively, even if a doctor collaborates, the adversary cannot be certain that
the doctor has followed his instructions. Bribed users are not modelled as part of the adversary,
as they may lie and are thus not trusted by the adversary. Due to the domain differences – in
e-voting and sealed-bid e-auctions, participants are fixed before the execution, whereas in e-health,
participants may be infinitely involving; in e-voting and sealed-bid e-auctions, each participant
executes the protocol exactly once, whereas in e-health, a participant may involve multiple/infinite
times. Thus, the formalisation in e-voting and sealed-bid e-auctions cannot be adopted. Inspired
by formalisations of receipt-freeness in e-voting [DKR09] and e-auction [DJP11], we define receipt-
freeness to be satisfied if there exists a process where the bribed doctor does not follow the
adversary’s instruction (e.g., prescribing a particular medicine), which is indistinguishable from a
process where she does.
Modelling this property necessitates modelling a doctor who genuinely reveals all her private
information to the adversary. This is achieved by the process transformation P chc by Delaune
et al. [DKR09]. This operation transforms a plain process P into one which shares all private
information over the channel chc with the adversary. The transformation P chc is defined as
follows: Let P be a plain process and chc a fresh channel name. P chc, the process that shares all
of P ’s secrets, is defined as:
• 0chc =ˆ 0,
• (P | Q)chc =ˆ P chc | Qchc,
• (νn.P )chc =ˆ
{
νn.out(chc, n).P chc when n is a name of base type,
νn.P chc otherwise,
• (in(v, x).P )chc =ˆ
{
in(v, x).out(chc, x).P chc when x is a variable of base type,
in(v, x).P chc otherwise,
• (out(v,M).P )chc =ˆ out(v,M).P chc,
• (!P )chc =ˆ !P chc,
• (if M =E N then P else Q)chc =ˆ if M =E N then P chc else Qchc.
In addition, we also use the transformation P \out(chc,·) [DKR09]. This models a process P which
hides all outputs on channel chc. Formally, P \out(chc,·) := νchc.(P | !in(chc, x)).
Definition 4 (receipt-freeness). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor role Rdr , satis-
fies receipt-freeness if for any two doctors dA and dB (dA 6= dB) and any two possible prescriptions
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pA and pB (pA 6= pB), there exist processes init ′dr and P ′dr , such that:
1. Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
];
2. Ceh [
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
],
where init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ) is a closed plain process, chc is a free fresh channel name,
process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr} can be 0.
In the definition, the sub-process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} models the sessions of dA that are not bribed,
and the sub-processes init ′dr and P
′
dr model the process in which the doctor dA lies to the adversary
about one of his prescriptions. The real prescription behaviour of dA is modelled by the second
equivalence. The first equivalence shows that the adversary cannot distinguish whether dA lied,
given a counter-balancing doctor dB.
Remark Receipt-freeness is stronger than prescription privacy (cf. Figure 6). Intuitively, this
is true since receipt-freeness is like prescription privacy except that the adversary may gain more
knowledge. Thus, if a protocol satisfies receipt-freeness (the adversary cannot break privacy with
more knowledge), prescription privacy must also be satisfied (the adversary cannot break privacy
with less knowledge). We prove this formally, following the proof that receipt-freeness is stronger
than vote-privacy in [ACRR10]. We prove that by applying an evaluation context that hides the
channel chc on both sides of the first equivalence in Definition 4, we can obtain Definition 3.
Proof. If a protocol satisfies receipt-freeness, there exists a closed plain process init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} |
P ′dr ) such that the two equations in Definition 4 are satisfied. By applying the evaluation context
νchc.( |!in(chc, x)) (defined as P \out(chc,·) in Section 3.5) on both sides of the first equation, we
obtain
Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
Lemma 1 [ACRR10]: Let C1 = νa˜1.( | B1) and C2 = νa˜2.( | B2) be two evaluation contexts such
that a˜1 ∩ (fv(B2)∪ fn(B2)) = ∅ and a˜2 ∩ (fv(B1)∪ fn(B1)) = ∅. We have that C1[C2[A]] ≡ C2[C1[A]]
for any extended process A.
Using Lemma 1, we can rewrite the left-hand side (1) and the right-hand side (2) of the
equivalence as follows.
(1) Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≡ Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
)\out(chc,·) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
(2) Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≡ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
)\out(chc,·) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
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For equation (1), by the second equation in Definition 4, we have
Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
Lemma 2 [ACRR10]: let P be a closed plain process and chc a channel name such that
chc 6∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ). We have (P chc)\out(chc,·) ≈ℓ P .
For equation (2), using Lemma 2, we obtain that
Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
)\out(chc,·) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr}).(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc}))
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
By transitivity, we have
Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr}).(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc}))
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
],
which is exactly Definition 3.
The difference between this formalisation and receipt-freeness in e-voting [DKR09] and in
e-auctions [DJP11] is that in this definition only a part of the doctor process (the initiation
sub-process and a prescribing session) shares information with the adversary. In e-voting, each
voter only votes once. In the contrast, a doctor prescribes multiple times for various patients.
As patients and situations of patients vary, a doctor cannot prescribe medicine from the bribing
pharmaceutical company all the time. Therefore, only part of the doctor process shares information
with the adversary. Note that we model only one bribed prescribing session, as it is the simplest
scenario. This definition can be extended to model multiple prescribing sessions being bribed, by
replacing sub-process (initdr{dA/Iddr}) with the sub-process modelling multiple doctor sessions.
Note that the extended definition requires multiple sessions of the counter-balancing doctor or
multiple counter-balancing doctors.
Assume h sessions of dA are bribed, denoted as main
b
dr := main
1
dr | . . . | mainhdr , where
main idr := (maindr{dA/Iddr})chc. An arbitrary instance of the bribed sessions is denoted as
mainbdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc} := main1dr{p1A/presc} | . . . | mainhdr{phA/presc}. Assume there is a
counter-balancing process Pcdr of the bribed sessions. The process P
c
dr has h corresponding sessions
from one or more honest doctors. We use Pcdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc} to denote the counter-balancing
process where the prescriptions of the h sessions are p1
A
, . . . , ph
A
, respectively. Following definition 4,
the multi-session receipt-freeness can be defined as follows.
Definition 5 (multi-session receipt-freeness). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor
role Rdr , satisfies multi-session receipt-freeness, if for any doctor dA with h bribed sessions, denoted
as mainbdr := main
1
dr | . . . | mainhdr , where main idr := (maindr{dA/Iddr})chc, for any instantiation
of the prescriptions in the bribed sessions mainbdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc}, there exist processes init ′dr
and P ′dr , such that
1. Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) | Pcdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc}]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | mainbdr{(p1A . . . , phA)/presc}
) |
Pcdr{(p1B, . . . , phB)/presc}];
2. Ceh [
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) | Pcdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc}]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , p1B/presc} | . . . |
maindr{dA/Iddr , phB/presc})
) | Pcdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc}],
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where init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ) is a closed plain process, chc is a free fresh channel name,
process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr} can be 0, Pcdr is less than h doctor processes running
in parallel and Pcdr{(p1A, . . . , phA)/presc} denotes that in some sessions of the doctor processes, the
prescriptions are instantiated with p1
A
, . . . , ph
A
.
Definition 4 (receipt-freeness) is a specific instance of this definition where only one session of
the targeted doctor is bribed. When multiple sessions are bribed, to ensure multi-session receipt-
freeness, it requires the existence of more than one counter-balancing doctor sessions, and thus
this extended definition is stronger than receipt-freeness (Definition 4), meaning that if a protocol
satisfied the multi-session receipt-freeness where multiple sessions are bribed, then the protocol
satisfies receipt-freeness where only one session is bribed. The intuition is that if there exists a
lying process for multiple bribed sessions such that multi-session receipt-freeness is satisfied, by
hiding the communications to the adversary in the lying process except one session, we can obtain
the lying process such that receipt-freeness is satisfied. More concretely, when receipt-freeness is
satisfied, multi-session receipt-freeness may not be satisfied. For example, when there are exactly
two users and two nonces generated by each user, if the revealed information is only the two
nonces, a bribed user can lie to the adversary about his nonce, since the link between the user
and the nonce is private. However, if the user is bribed on two sessions, i.e., the link between him
and his two nonces, then at least one nonce has to be generated by the user, hence, multi-session
receipt-freeness (two sessions in particular) is not satisfied.
Remark that we restrict the way a bribed user collaborates with the adversary: we only model
forwarding information to the adversary. The scenario that the adversary provides prescriptions
for a bribed doctor, similar to in coercion in e-voting [DKR09], is not modelled. Although pro-
viding ready-made prescriptions is theoretically possible, we consider this to not be a practical
attack: correctly prescribing requires professional (sometimes empirical) medical expertise and
heavily depends on examination of the patient. As such, no adversary can prepare an appropriate
prescription without additional information. Moreover, forwarding a non-appropriate description
carries serious legal consequences for the forwarding doctor. Therefore, we omit the case where
the doctor merely forwards an adversary-prepared prescription. The adversary could still pre-
pare other information for the bribed doctor, for example, the randomness of a bit-commitment.
Such adversary-prepared information may lead to a stronger adversary than we are considering.
To model such a scenario, the verifier needs to specify exactly which information is prepared
by the adversary. Formalisation of such scenarios can follow the formal framework proposed
in [DKR09, DJP13].
3.6 Independency of prescription privacy
Usually, e-health systems have to deal with a complex constellation of roles: doctors, patients,
pharmacists, insurance companies, medical administration, etc. Each of these roles has access to
different private information and has different privacy concerns. An untrusted role may be bribed
to reveal private information to the adversary such that the adversary can break the privacy of
another role. De Decker et al. [dDLVV08] note that pharmacists may have sensitive data which
can be revealed to the adversary to break a doctor’s prescription privacy. To prevent a party from
revealing sensitive data that affects a doctor’s privacy, e-health protocols are required to satisfy
independency of prescription privacy. The DLV08 protocol, for example, requires prescription
privacy independent of pharmacists [dDLVV08]. Intuitively, independency of prescription privacy
means that even if another party Ri reveals their information (i.e., R
chc
i ), the adversary is not able
to break a doctor’s prescription privacy.
Definition 6 (independency of prescription privacy). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a
doctor role Rdr , satisfies prescription privacy independent of role Ri, if for all possible doctors dA
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and dB (dA 6= dB) we have
Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
].
where pA and pB (pA 6= pB) are any two possible prescriptions, Ri is a non-doctor role, process
!Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr} can be 0.
Note that we assume a worst-case situation in which role Ri genuinely cooperates with the ad-
versary. For example, the pharmacist forwards all information obtained from channels hidden
from the adversary. The equivalence requires that no matter how role Ri cooperates with the
adversary, the adversary cannot link a doctor to the doctor’s prescriptions. The cooperation be-
tween pharmacists and the adversary is modelled in the same way as the cooperation between
bribed doctors and the adversary, i.e., !Ri
chc. We do not model the situation where the adversary
prepares information for the pharmacists, as we focus on doctor privacy – information sent out by
the pharmacist does not affect doctor privacy, so there is no reason to control this information.
Instead of modelling the pharmacists as compromised users, our modelling allows the definition
to be easily extended to model new properties which capture situations where pharmacists lie to
the adversary due to, for example, coalition between pharmacists and bribed doctors. In addition,
although we do not model delivery of medicine, pharmacists do need to adhere to regulations
in providing medicine. Thus, an adversary who only controls the network cannot impersonate a
pharmacist.
Just as receipt-freeness is stronger than prescription privacy, independency of prescription pri-
vacy is stronger than prescription privacy (cf. Figure 6). Intuitively, this holds since the adversary
obtains at least as much information in independency of prescription privacy as in prescription
privacy. Formally, one can derive Definition 3 from Definition 6 by hiding channel chc on the
left-hand side as well as the right-hand side of the equivalence in Definition 6.
Proof. Consider a protocol that satisfies independency of prescription privacy. This protocol thus
satisfies definition 6. By applying the evaluation context νchc.( |!in(chc, x)) to both the left-hand
side and the right-hand side of Definition 6, we obtain
Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≈ℓ Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·).
According to Lemma 1, we have
Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≡ Ceh [!Richc\out(chc,·) |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
Ceh [!Richc |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]\out(chc,·)
≡ Ceh [!Richc\out(chc,·) |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
According to Lemma 2, we have
Ceh [!Richc\out(chc,·) |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Ri |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
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Ceh [!Richc\out(chc,·) |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Ri |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
Therefore, by transitivity, we have
Ceh [!Ri |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Ri |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
which is exactly Definition 3.
Note that the first step in the proof (application of an evaluation context) cannot be reversed.
Therefore, prescription privacy is weaker than independency of prescription privacy.
3.7 Independency of receipt-freeness
We have discussed two situations where a doctor’s prescription behaviour can be revealed when
either the doctor or another different party cooperates with the adversary. It is natural to consider
the conjunction of these two, i.e., a situation in which the adversary coerces both a doctor and
another party (not a doctor). Since the adversary obtains more information, this constitutes a
stronger attack on doctor’s prescription privacy. To address this problem, we define independency
of receipt-freeness, which is satisfied when a doctor’s prescription privacy is preserved even if both
the doctor and another party reveal their private information to the adversary.
Definition 7 (independency of receipt-freeness). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor
role Rdr , satisfies receipt-freeness independent of role Ri if for any two doctors dA and dB (dA 6= dB)
and any two possible prescriptions pA and pB (pA 6= pB), there exist processes init ′dr and P ′dr , such
that:
1. Ceh [!Rchci |
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Rchci |
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
];
2. Ceh [!Rchci |
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Rchci |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
],
where init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ) is a closed plain process, Ri is a non-doctor role, chc is a free
fresh channel name, process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr} can be 0.
Independency of receipt-freeness implies receipt-freeness and independency of prescription pri-
vacy, each of which also implies prescription privacy (cf. Figure 6). The proof follows the same
reasoning as the proofs in [DJP13]. Intuitively, the adversary obtains more information with
independency of receipt-freeness (namely, from both doctor and pharmacist) than with either in-
dependency of prescription privacy (from pharmacist only) or receipt-freeness (from doctor only).
If the adversary is unable to break a doctor’s privacy using this much information, the adversary
will not be able to break doctor privacy using less information. Therefore, if a protocol satisfies
independency of receipt-freeness, then it must also satisfies independency of prescription privacy
and receipt-freeness. Similarly, since the adversary obtains more information in both independency
of prescription privacy and in receipt-freeness than in prescription privacy, if a protocol satisfies
either independency of prescription privacy or receipt-freeness, it must also satisfies prescription
privacy.
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3.8 Anonymity and strong anonymity
Anonymity is a privacy property that protects users’ identities. We model anonymity as indistin-
guishability of processes initiated by two different users.
Definition 8 (doctor anonymity). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor role Rdr
satisfies doctor anonymity if for any doctor dA, there exists another doctor dB (dB 6= dA), such that
Ceh [initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr}] ≈ℓ Ceh [initdr{dB/Iddr}.!Pdr{dB/Iddr}].
A stronger property of anonymity is defined in [ACRR10], capturing the situation that the
adversary cannot even find out whether a user (with identity dA) has participated in a session of
the protocol or not.
Definition 9 (strong doctor anonymity [ACRR10]). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a
doctor role Rdr satisfies strong doctor anonymity, if
Peh ≈ℓ νm˜c.init .
(
!R1 | . . . |!Rn | (initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr})
)
.
Recall that the unveiling of a doctor’s identity (when used) is performed outside the pro-
cess initdr (see Section 3.2). Therefore, the above two definitions do not include generation nor
unveiling of doctor identities in the initialization phase.
Obviously, the concept of strong doctor anonymity is intended to be stronger than the concept
of doctor anonymity. We show that it is impossible to satisfy strong doctor anonymity without
satisfying doctor anonymity (arrow R5 in Figure 6).
Proof. Assume that a protocol Peh satisfies strong doctor anonymity but not doctor anonymity.
That is, Peh satisfies Definition 9, i.e.,
Peh ≈ℓ νm˜c.init .
(
!R1 | . . . |!Rn | (initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr})
)
, (1)
but there exists no dB such that the equation in Definition 8 is satisfied. That is, ∄dB s.t.
Ceh [initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr}] ≈ℓ Ceh [initdr{dB/Iddr}.!Pdr{dB/Iddr}]. (2)
Since
Ceh [ ] := νm˜c.init .(!R1 | . . . |!Rn | ),
we have
Ceh [initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr}] := νm˜c.init .(!R1 | . . . |!Rn | (initdr{dA/Iddr}.!Pdr{dA/Iddr})).
That is, the right-hand side of the equation (1) is exactly the left-hand side of the equation (2).
Therefore, there exists no dB such that the following equation holds,
Peh ≈ℓ Ceh [initdr{dB/Iddr}.!Pdr{dB/Iddr}]. (3)
Since Peh := νm˜c.init .(!R1 | . . . |!Rn), by letting dB be an identity of a doctor process in Peh , the
equation (3) holds. There obviously exists a dB such that the equation (3) holds. This contradicts
the assumption.
Anonymity and strong anonymity may be similarly defined for other roles. We provide definitions
for patient anonymity, anonymity for other roles is defined analogously.
Definition 10 (patient anonymity). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a patient role Rpt
satisfies patient anonymity if for any patient tA, there exists another patient tB (tB 6= tA), such
that
Ceh [initpt{tA/Idpt}.!Ppt{tA/Idpt}] ≈ℓ Ceh [initpt{tB/Idpt}.!Ppt{tB/Idpt}].
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Definition 11 (strong patient anonymity [ACRR10]). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a
patient role Rpt satisfies strong doctor anonymity, if
Peh ≈ℓ νm˜c.init .
(
!R1 | . . . |!Rn | (initpt{tA/Idpt}.!Ppt{tA/Idpt})
)
.
As with the case for doctor anonymity, strong patient anonymity is stronger than patient
anonymity (R7 in Figure 6). The proof is analoguous to the proof above.
3.9 Untraceability and strong untraceability
Untraceability is a property preventing the adversary from tracing a user, meaning that he cannot
tell whether two executions are initiated by the same user.
Definition 12 (doctor untraceability). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a doctor role Rdr
satisfies doctor untraceability if, for any two doctors dA and dB 6= dA,
Ceh [initdr{dA/Iddr}.(Pdr{dA/Iddr} | Pdr{dA/Iddr})]
≈ℓ Ceh [(initdr{dA/Iddr}.Pdr{dA/Iddr}) | (initdr{dB/Iddr}.Pdr{dB/Iddr})].
A stronger version of untraceability, proposed in [ACRR10], captures the adversary’s inability
to distinguish the situation where one user executes the protocol multiple times from each user
executing the protocol at most once.
Definition 13 (strong doctor untraceability [ACRR10]). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with
a doctor role Rdr being the j
th role, satisfies strong doctor untraceability, if
Peh ≈ℓ νm˜c.init .
(
!R1 | . . . |!Rj−1 |!Rj+1 |!Rn |!(νIddr .initdr .Pdr )
)
.
Similarly, we can define untraceability and strong untraceability for patient and other roles in
a protocol, by replacing the doctor role with a different role.
Definition 14 (patient untraceability). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with a patient role
Rpt satisfies patient untraceability if, for any two patients tA and tB 6= tA,
Ceh [initpt{tA/Idpt}.(Ppt{tA/Idpt} | Ppt{tA/Idpt})]
≈ℓ Ceh [(initpt{tA/Idpt}.Ppt{tA/Idpt}) | (initpt{tB/Idpt}.Ppt{tB/Idpt})].
Definition 15 (strong patient untraceability [ACRR10]). A well-formed e-health protocol Peh with
a patient role Rpt being the j
th role, satisfies strong doctor untraceability, if
Peh ≈ℓ νm˜c.init .
(
!R1 | . . . |!Rj−1 |!Rj+1 |!Rn |!(νIdpt .initpt .Ppt )
)
.
Strong (doctor/patient) anonymity is stronger than (doctor/patient) anonymity, as the two
processes (left-hand side and right hand side of the equivalence) in (doctor/patient) anonymity
are instances of the two processes in strong (doctor/patient) anonymity respectively. Hence, if a
protocol satisfies strong (doctor/patient) anonymity, it also satisfies (doctor/patient) anonymity.
It is evidenced by that the DLV08 protocol (see Section 4) satisfies doctor anonymity (without
doctor ID revealed), but does not satisfy strong doctor anonymity.
Once again, the strong notions of doctor/patient untraceability are stronger than the standard
doctor/patient untraceability (see R6 and R7, respectively, in Figure 6). The proof is again
analoguous to the proof showing strong doctor anonymity is stronger than doctor anonymity.
Finally, note that the strong versions of anonymity are not comparable to the strong versions of
untraceability (e.g. strong patient anonymity is not comparable to strong patient untraceability).
Strong anonymity and strong untraceability capture different aspects of privacy – anonymity
focuses on the link between participants and their identities, whereas untraceability focuses on the
link between sessions of a participant. This is supported by the case study in Section 4 where the
strong doctor anonymity and strong doctor untraceability fail due to different reasons – the model
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independency of receipt-freeness
receipt-freeness independency of prescription privacy
prescription privacy
R3 R4
R1 R2
strong doctor annonymity strong doctor untraceability strong patient anonymity strong patient untraceability
doctor anonymity doctor untraceability patient anonymity patient untraceability
R5 R6 R7 R8
Figure 6: Relations between privacy properties
where strong doctor anonymity is satisfied, does not satisfy strong doctor untraceability, and vice
versa.
Similarly, prescription privacy and doctor anonymity are not comparable either. Doctor
anonymity aims to protect the doctor identity whereas prescription privacy aims to protect the
link between a doctor’s identity and his prescriptions. For instance, a system in which there is one
doctor may satisfy doctor anonymity, if that the doctor’s identity is perfectly protected. However,
the system would not satisfy prescription privacy, since there is no counter-balancing doctor.
Conversely, consider a system where two doctors send out their public keys over public channels
and afterwards each doctor sends one prescription via a private channel to the trusted authority,
who finally outputs both prescriptions. Such a system may satisfy prescription privacy, due to
the assumptions of private channel and trusted authority. That is: on the left hand side of the
equation in Definition 3, the adversary observes two public keys followed by two prescriptions; on
the right hand side, the adversary observes exactly the same. But this system does not satisfy
anonymity since the adversary can block communication of participants in Ceh and observe the
public channel – on the left hand side of the equation in Definition 8, the adversary observes the
public key of dA, while on the right hand side, the adversary observes the public key of dB.
4 Case study: the DLV08 protocol
In this section, we apply the above formal definitions for doctor privacy in a case study as a
validation of the definitions. We choose to analyse the DLV08 e-health protocol proposed by
De Decker et al. [dDLVV08], as it claims enforced privacy for doctors. However, our analysis is
not restricted to doctor privacy. We provide a rather complete analysis of the protocol including
patient anonymity, patient untraceability, patient/doctor information secrecy and patient/doctor
authentication as well. The ProVerif code used to perform this analysis is available from [DJP12a].
The DLV08 protocol is a complex health care protocol for the Belgium situation. It captures
most aspects of the current Belgian health care practice and aims to provide a strong guarantee
of privacy for patients and doctors. Our analysis of this protocol focuses on the below properties.
For those that are explicitly claimed by DLV08, the corresponding claim identifier in that paper
is given. In addition to those, we analyse secrecy, prescription privacy, receipt-freeness, and
independency of receipt-freeness, which are implicitly mentioned.
• Secrecy of patient and doctor information: no other party should be able to know a patient
or a doctor’s information, unless the information is intended to be revealed in the protocol
(for formal definitions, see Section 6.1 and Section 6.2).
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• Authentication ([dDLVV08]: S1): all parties should properly authenticate each other (for
formal definitions, see Section 6.1 and Section 6.3).
• Patient anonymity ([dDLVV08]: P3): no party should be able to determine a patient’s
identity.
• Patient untraceability ([dDLVV08]: P2): prescriptions issued to the same patient should not
be linkable to each other.
• Prescription privacy: the protocol protects a doctor’s prescription behaviour.
• Receipt-freeness: the protocol prevents bribery between doctors and pharmaceutical com-
panies.
• Independency of prescription privacy ([dDLVV08]: P4): pharmacists should not be able to
provide evidence to pharmaceutical companies about doctors’ prescription.
• Independency of receipt-freeness: pharmacists should not be able to provide evidence to
pharmaceutical companies about doctors’ prescription even if the doctor is bribed.
The rest of this section describes the DLV08 protocol in more detail.
4.1 Roles
The protocol involves seven roles. We focus on the five roles involved in the core process: doctor,
patient, pharmacist, medicine prescription administrator (MPA) and health insurance institute
(HII). The other two roles, public safety organisation (PSO) and social security organisation
(SSO), provide properties such as revocability and reimbursement. As we do not focus on these
properties, and as these roles are only tangentially involved in the core process, we omit these
roles from our model.
The roles interact as follows: a doctor prescribes medicine to a patient; next the patient obtains
medicine from a pharmacist according to the prescription; following that, the pharmacist forwards
the prescription to his MPA, the MPA checks the prescription and refunds the pharmacist; finally,
the MPA sends invoices to the patient’s HII and is refunded.
4.2 Cryptographic primitives
To ensure security and privacy properties, the DLV08 protocol employs several specific crypto-
graphic primitives, besides the classical ones, like encryption. We briefly introduce these crypto-
graphic primitives.
Bit-commitments. The bit-commitments scheme consists of two phases, committing phase and
opening phase. On the committing phase, a message sender commits to a message. This can be
considered as putting the message into a box, and sending the box to the receiver. Later in the
opening phase, the sender sends the key of the box to the receiver. The receiver opens the box
and obtains the message.
Zero-knowledge proofs. A zero-knowledge proof is a cryptographic scheme which is used by
one party (prover) to prove to another party (verifier) that a statement is true, without leaking
secret information of the prover. A zero-knowledge proof scheme may be either interactive or
non-interactive. We consider non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in this protocol.
Digital credentials. A digital credential is a certificate, proving that the holder satisfies certain
requirements. Unlike paper certificates (such as passports) which give out the owner’s identity,
a digital credential can be used to authenticate the owner anonymously. For example, a digital
credential can be used to prove that a driver is old enough to drive without revealing the actual
age of the driver.
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Anonymous authentication. Anonymous authentication is a scheme for authenticating a user
anonymously, e.g., [BCKL08]. The procedure of anonymous authentication is actually a zero-
knowledge proof, with the digital credential being the public information of the prover. In the
scheme, a user’s digital credential is used as the public key in a public key authentication struc-
ture. Using this, a verifier can check whether a message is signed correctly by the prover (the
person authenticating himself), while the verifier cannot identify the prover. Thus, this ensures
anonymous authentication.
Verifiable encryptions. Verifiable encryption is based on zero-knowledge proofs as well. A
prover encrypts a message, and uses zero-knowledge proofs to prove that the encrypted message
satisfies specific properties without revealing the original message.
Signed proofs of knowledge. Signed proofs of knowledge provide a way of using proofs of
knowledge as a digital signature scheme (cf. [Bra00]). Intuitively, a prover signs a message using
secret information, which can be considered as a secret signing key. The prover can convince the
verifier using proofs of knowledge only if the prover has the right secret key. Thus it proves the
origination of the message.
4.3 Setting
The initial information available to a participant is as follows.
• A doctor has an identity (Iddr ), a pseudonym (Pnymdr ), and an anonymous doctor credential
(Creddr ) issued by trusted authorities.
• A patient has an identity (Idpt ), a pseudonym (Pnympt ), an HII (Hii), a social security status
(Sss), a health expense account (Acc) and an anonymous patient credential (Credpt ) issued
by trusted authorities.
• Pharmacists, MPA, and HII are public entities, each of which has an identity (Idph , Idmpa ,
Idhii), a secret key (skph , skmpa , skhii) and an authorised public key certificate (pkph , pkmpa ,
pkhii) issued by trusted authorities.
We assume that a user does not take two roles with the same identity. Hence, one user taking two
roles are considered as two individual users.
4.4 Description of the protocol
The DLV08 protocol consists of four sub-protocols: doctor-patient sub-protocol, patient-pharmacist
sub-protocol, pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol, and MPA-HII sub-protocol. We describe the sub-
protocols one by one.
4.4.1 Doctor-patient sub-protocol
The doctor authenticates himself to a patient by anonymous authentication with the authorised
doctor credential as public information. The patient verifies the doctor credential. If the ver-
ification passes, the patient anonymously authenticates himself to the doctor using the patient
credential, sends the bit-commitments on his identity to the doctor, and proves to the doctor that
the identity used in the credential is the same as in the bit-commitments. After verifying the
patient credential, the doctor generates a prescription, computes a prescription identity, computes
the doctor bit-commitments. Then the doctor combines these computed messages with the re-
ceived patient bit-commitments; signs these messages using a signed proof of knowledge, which
proves that the doctor’s pseudonym used in the doctor credential is the same as in the doctor
bit-commitments. Together with the proof, the doctor sends the opening information, which is
used to open the doctor bit-commitments. The communication in the doctor-patient sub-protocol
is shown as a message sequence chart (MSC, [MB01]) in Figure 7.
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Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc
pt
Iddr , Pnymdr
dr
anonymous authentication (Authdr )
verify authentication,
commit on Idpt (Comtpt )
anonymous authentication (Authpt ),
commitment (Comtpt ),
PtProof (zk: link between Authpt , Comtpt )
verify authentication,
commit on Pnymdr ,
prescribe medicine presc,
compute prescription identity
PrescProof (spk: prove the link between
Authdr , Comtdr , presc and the patient),
openning information to commitment
verify PrescProof ,
open Comtdr
msc [DLV08] I. Doctor-Patient sub-protocol
Figure 7: Doctor-Patient sub-protocol.
4.4.2 Patient-Pharmacist sub-protocol
The pharmacist authenticates himself to the patient using public key authentication. The patient
verifies the authentication and obtains, from the authentication, the pharmacist’s identity and the
pharmacist’s MPA. Then the patient anonymously authenticates himself to the pharmacist, and
proves his social security status. Next, the patient computes verifiable encryptions vc1, vc2, vc3,
vc′3, vc4, vc5, where
• vc1 encrypts the patient’s HII using the MPA’s public key and proves that the HII encrypted
in vc1 is the same as the one in the patient’s credential.
• vc2 encrypts the doctor’s pseudonym using the MPA’s public key and proves that the doctor’s
pseudonym encrypted in vc2 is the same as the one in the doctor commitment embedded in
the prescription.
• vc3 encrypts the patient’s pseudonym using the public safety organisation’s public key and
proves that the pseudonym encrypted in vc3 is the same as the one in the patient’s commit-
ment.
• vc′3 encrypts the patient’s HII using the social security organisation’s public key and proves
that the content encrypted in vc′3 is the same as the HII in the patient’s credential.
• vc4 encrypts the patient’s pseudonym using the MPA’s public key and proves that the
patient’s pseudonym encrypted in vc4 is the same as the one in the patient’s credential.
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Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc
pt
skph , Idmpa , pkph
ph
public key authentication
verify authentication
obtain MPA identity from it
anonymous authenticate PtAuthSss (prove Sss)
compute verifiable encryptions vc1,
vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, vc5, encryption c5
(encrypt patient information for
MPA, HII and SSO)
PrescProof , vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5,
PtSpk (spk: link between PrescProof , PtAuthSss)
verify
vc1,vc2,vc3,
vc′3,vc4, PtSpk ,
PrescProof
bill
payment
deliver medicine
invoice
ReceiptAck (spk: prove ability to construct Credpt )
msc [DLV08] II. Patient-Pharmacist
Figure 8: Patient-Pharmacist sub-protocol.
• vc5 encrypts the patient’s pseudonym using his HII’s public key and proves that the patient’s
pseudonym encrypted in vc5 is the same as the one in the patient’s credential.
• c5 encrypts vc5 using the MPA’s public key.
The patient sends the received prescription to the pharmacist and proves to the pharmacist
that the patient’s identity in the prescription is the same as in the patient credential. The patient
sends vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5 as well. The pharmacist verifies the correctness of all the received
messages. If every message is correctly formatted, the pharmacist charges the patient, and de-
livers the medicine. Then the pharmacist generates an invoice and sends it to the patient. The
patient computes a receipt ReceiptAck : signing a message (consists of the prescription identity,
the pharmacist’s identity, vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, vc5) using a signed proof of knowledge and
proving that he knows the patient credential. This receipt proves that the patient has received
his medicine. The pharmacist verifies the correctness of the receipt. The communication in the
patient-Pharmacist sub-protocol is shown in Figure 8. Since the payment and medicine delivery
procedures are out of the protocol scope, they are interpreted as dashed arrows in the figure.
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skph , Idph , pkph
ph
skmpa , Idmpa , pkmpa
mpa
public key authentication
public key authentication
forward PrescProof , vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3,
vc4, c5, ReceiptAck
verify PrescProof , vc1, vc2,
vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, ReceiptAck
Pnympt := dec(vc4, skmpa)
Hii := dec(vc1, skmpa)
Pnymdr := dec(vc2, skmpa)
vc5 := dec(c5, skmpa )
msc [DLV08] III. Pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol
Figure 9: Pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol.
4.4.3 Pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol
The pharmacist and the MPA first authenticate each other using public key authentication. Next,
the pharmacist sends the received prescription and the receipt ReceiptAck , together with vc1, vc2,
vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5, to the MPA. The MPA verifies correctness of the received information. Then the
MPA decrypts vc1, vc2, vc4 and c5, which provide the patient’s HII, the doctor’s pseudonym, the
patient’s pseudonym, and vc5. The communication in the pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol is shown
in Figure 9. Note that after authentication, two parties often establish a secure communication
channel. However, it is not mentioned in [dDLVV08] that the pharmacist and the MPA agree on
anything. Nevertheless, this does not affect the properties that we verified, except authentication
between pharmacist and MPA.
4.4.4 MPA-HII sub-protocol
The MPA and the patient’s HII first authenticate each other using public key authentication. Then
the MPA sends the receipt ReceiptAck to the patient’s HII as well as the verifiable encryption vc5
which encrypts the patient’s pseudonym with the patient’s HII’s public key. The patient’s HII
checks the correctness of ReceiptAck , decrypts vc5 and obtains the patient’s pseudonym. From
the patient pseudonym, the HII obtains the identity of the patient; then updates the patient’s
account and pays the MPA. The MPA pays the pharmacist when he receives the payment. The
communication in the MPA-HII sub-protocol is shown in Figure 10. Similar to the previous
sub-protocol, there is nothing established during the authentication which can be used in the
later message exchanges. Note that in addition to authentications between MPA and HII, this
affects the secrecy of a patient’s pseudonym when the adversary controls dishonest patients (see
Section 6.9.1).
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skmpa , Idmpa , pkmpa
mpa
skhii , Idhii , pkhii
hii
public key authentication
public key authentication
forward ReceiptAck , vc5
verify ReceiptAck , vc5
Pnympt := dec(vc5, skhii)
obtain Idpt and Acc,
update Acc
reimbursement
msc [DLV08] VI. MPA-HII sub-protocol
Figure 10: MPA-HII sub-protocol.
5 Modelling DLV08
Wemodel the DLV08 protocol in the applied pi calculus as introduced in Section 3.1. For clarity, we
also borrow some syntactic expressions from ProVerif, such as key words ‘fun’, ‘private fun’, ‘reduc’
and ‘equation ’, and expression ‘let x = N in P ′. Particularly, ‘(private) fun’ denotes a constructor
which uses terms to form a more complex term (’private ’ means the adversary cannot use it).
‘reduc’ and ‘equation ’ are key words used to construct the equational theory E. ‘reduc’ denotes
a destructor which retrieves sub-terms of a constructed term. For the cryptographic primitives
that cannot be captured by destructors, ProVerif provides ‘equation’ to capture the relationship
between constructors. The expression ‘let x = N in P ’ is used as syntactical substitutions, i.e.,
P{N/x} in the applied pi calculus. It is an abbreviation of ‘let x = N in P else Q′ when Q is the
null process. When N is a destructor, there are two possible outcomes. If the term N does not
fail, then x is bound to N and process P is taken, otherwise Q (in this case, the null process) is
taken.
Since the description of the protocol in its original paper is not clear in some details, before
modelling the protocol, several ambiguities need to be settled (Section 5.1). Next we explain the
modelling of the cryptographic primitives (Section 5.2), since security and privacy rely heavily on
these cryptographic primitives in the protocol. Then, we illustrate the modelling of the protocol
(Section 5.3).
5.1 Underspecification of the DLV08 protocol
The DLV08 protocol leaves the following issues unspecified:
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a1: whether a zero-knowledge proof is transferable;
a2: whether an encryption is probabilistic;
a3: whether a patient/doctor uses a fresh identity and/or pseudonym for each session;
a4: whether credentials are freshly generated in each session;
a5: what a patient’s social security status is and how it can be modified;
a6: how many HIIs exist and whether a patient can change his HII;
a7: whether a patient/doctor can obtain a credential by requesting one;
a8: what type of communication channels are used (public or untappable).
To be able to discover potential flaws on privacy, we make the following (weakest) assumptions in
our modelling of the DLV08 protocol:
s1: the zero-knowledge proofs used are non-interactive and transferable;
s2: encryptions are not probabilistic;
s3: a patient/doctor uses the same identity and pseudonym in every session;
s4: a patient/doctor has the same credential in every session;
s5: a patient’s social security status is the same in every session;
s6: there are many HIIs, different patients may have different HIIs, and a patient’s
HII is fixed and cannot be changed;
s7: a patient/doctor’s credential can be obtained by requesting one;
s8: the communication channels are public.
Note that some assumptions may look weak to security experts, for example the assumption of
deterministic encryption. However, without explicit warning, deterministic encryption algorithms
may be used, which will lead to security flaws. With this in mind, we assume the weakest assump-
tion when there is ambiguity. By assuming weak assumptions and showing the security flaws with
the assumptions, we provide security warnings for the implementation of the protocol.
5.2 Modelling cryptographic primitives
The cryptographic primitives are modelled in the applied pi calculus using function symbols and
equations. All functions and equational theory are summarised in Figures 11, 12 and 13.
fun true/0. fun hash/3. fun pk/1. fun enc/2.
fun commit/2. fun sign/2. fun zk/2. fun spk/3.
fun invoice/1. fun key/1. fun host/1.
private fun drcred/2. private fun ptcred/5.
Figure 11: Functions.
reduc dec(enc(m, pk(sk)), sk) = m. (*asymmetric encryption*)
reduc open(commit(x, y), y) = x. (*bit commitments*)
reduc Vfy-sign(sign(x, y), pk(y)) = true. (*signature verification*)
reduc getsignmsg(sign(x, y), pk(y)) = x. (*message from signature*)
reduc getpublic(zk(x, y)) = y. (*public part of ZK*)
reduc getmsg(spk(x, y, z)) = z. (*message of SPK*)
reduc getSpkVinfo(spk(x, y, z)) = y. (*public part of SPK*)
equation key(host(x)) = x. (*an identity has a unique public key*)
equation host(key(x)) = x. (*a public key belongs to a unique
identity*)
Figure 12: Equational theory part I: non-zero-knowledge part.
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reduc Vfy-zkAuthdr (zk((Pnymdr , Iddr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )) = true.
reduc Vfy-zkAuthpt (zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)) = true.
reduc Vfy-zkPtProof(zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(commit(Idpt , rpt),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc))),
commit(Idpt , rpt),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)) = true.
reduc Vfy-spkPrescProof (spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
(presc,PrescriptID , commit(Pnymdr , rdr ),
commit(Idpt , rpt ))),
drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ), presc,PrescriptID ,
commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), commit(Idpt , rpt)) = true.
reduc Vfy-zkPtAuthSss(zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), Sss),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), Sss) = true.
reduc Vfy-spkPtSpk(spk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc, rpt),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), commit(Idpt , rpt)),
nonce),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
commit(Idpt , rpt), nonce) = true.
reduc Vfy-vencHii(zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Hii, pkx ))),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), enc(Hii, pkx ), pkx ) = true.
reduc Vfy-vencDrnymMpa(zk((Pnymdr , rdr ),
(spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
(presc,PrescriptID ,
commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), cph Comtpt )),
enc(Pnymdr , pkx ))),
spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
(presc,PrescriptID ,
commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), cph Comtpt )),
enc(Pnymdr , pkx ), pkx ) = true.
reduc Vfy-vencPtnym(zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), enc(Pnympt , pkx ))),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Pnympt , pkx ), pkx ) = true.
reduc Vfy-spkReceiptAck(spk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(c PrescriptID , cpt Idph , vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5)),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
c PrescriptID , cpt Idph , vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5) = true.
Figure 13: Equational theory part II: zero-knowledge part.
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Bit-commitments. The bit-commitments scheme is modelled as two functions: commit, mod-
elling the committing phase, and open, modelling the opening phase. The function commit creates
a commitment with two parameters: a message m and a random number r. A commitment can
only be opened with the correct opening information r, in which case the message m is revealed.
fun commit/2.
reduc open(commit(m, r), r) = m.
Zero-knowledge proofs. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs can be modelled as function
zk(secrets, pub info) inspired by [BMU08]. The public verification information pub info and the
secret information secrets satisfy a pre-specified relation. Since the secret information is only
known by the prover, only the prover can construct the zero-knowledge proof. To verify a
zero-knowledge proof is to check whether the relation between the secret information and the
verification information is satisfied. Verification of a zero-knowledge proof is modelled as func-
tion Vfy-zk(zk(secrets , pub info), verif info), with a zero-knowledge proof to be verified zk(secrets ,
pub info) and the verification information verif info. Compared to the more generic definitions
in [BMU08], we define each zero-knowledge proof specifically, as only a limited number of zero-
knowledge proofs are used in the protocol. We specify each verification rule in Figure 13. Since
the pub info and verif info happen to be the same in all the zero-knowledge proofs verifications
in this protocol, the generic structure of verification rule is given as
Vfy-zk(zk(secrets , pub info), pub info) = true,
where true is a constant. The specific function to check a zero-knowledge proof of type z is
denoted as Vfy-zkz , e.g., verification of a patient’s anonymous authentication modelled by function
Vfy-zkAuthpt .
Digital credentials. A digital credential is issued by trusted authorities. We assume the pro-
cedure of issuing a credential is perfect, which means that the adversary cannot forge a credential
nor obtain one by impersonation. We model digital credentials as a private function (declaimed by
key word private fun in ProVerif) which is only usable by honest users. In the DLV08 protocol,
a credential can have several attributes; we model these as parameters of the credential function.
private fun drcred/2. private fun ptcred/5.
There are two credentials in the DLV08 protocol: a doctor credential which is modelled as
Creddr := drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ), and a patient credential which is modelled as Credpt :=
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc). Unlike private data, the two private functions cannot be co-
erced, meaning that even by coercing, the adversary cannot apply the private functions. Because a
doctor having an anonymous credentials is a basic setting of the protocol, and thus the procedure
of obtaining a credential is not assumed to be bribed or coerced. However, the adversary can
coerce patients or doctors for the credentials and parameters of the private functions.
Anonymous authentication. The procedure of anonymous authentication is a zero-knowledge
proof using the digital credential as public information. The anonymous authentication of a doctor
is modelled as
Authdr := zk((Pnymdr , Iddr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
and the verification of the authentication is modelled as
Vfy-zkAuthdr (Authdr , drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )).
The equational theory for the verification is
reduc Vfy-zkAuthdr (zk((Pnymdr , Iddr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )) = true.
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The verification implies that the creator of the authentication is a doctor who has the credential
drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ). Because only legitimate doctors can obtain a credential from authorities, i.e.,
use the function drcred to create a credential; and the correspondence between the parameters of
the anonymous authentication (the first parameter (Pnymdr , Iddr ) in Authdr ) and the parameters
of the credential (parameters Pnymdr andIddr in drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )) ensures that the prover can
only be the owner of the credential. Other doctors may be able to use function drcred but do
not know Pnymdr and Iddr , and thus cannot create a valid proof. The adversary can observe a
credential drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ), but does not know secrets Pnymdr , Iddr , and thus cannot forge
a valid zero-knowledge proof. If the adversary forges a zero-knowledge proof with fake secret
information Pnymdr
′ and Iddr
′, the fake zero-knowledge proof will not pass verification. For the
same reason, a validated proof proves that the credential belongs to the creator of the zero-
knowledge proof. Similarly, an anonymous authentication of a patient is modelled as
Authpt := zk( (Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)),
and the verification rule is modelled as
reduc Vfy-zkAuthpt ( zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)) = true.
Verifiable encryptions. A verifiable encryption is modelled as a zero-knowledge proof. The
encryption is embedded in the zero-knowledge proof as public information. The receiver can
obtain the cipher text from the proof. For example, assume a patient wants to prove that he has
encrypted a secret s using a public key k to a pharmacist, while the pharmacist does not know
the corresponding secret key for k. The pharmacist cannot open the cipher text to test whether
it uses the public key k for encryption. However, the zero-knowledge proof can prove that the
cipher text is encrypted using k, while not revealing the secret s. The general structure of the
verification of a verifiable encryption is
Vfy-venc(zk(secrets , (pub info, cipher )), verif info) = true,
where secrets is private information, pub info and cipher consist public information, verif info is
the verification information.
Signed proofs of knowledge. A signed proof of knowledge is a scheme which signs a message,
and proves a property of the signer. For the DLV08 protocol, this proof only concerns equality
of attributes of credentials and commitments (e.g., the identity of this credential is the same as
the identity of that commitment). To verify a signed proof of knowledge, the verifier must know
which credentials/commitments are considered. Hence, this information must be obtainable from
the proof, and thus is included in the model. In general, a signed proof of knowledge is modelled
as function
spk(secrets , pub info,msg),
which models a signature using private value(s) secrets on the message msg, with public infor-
mation pub info as settings. Similar to zero-knowledge proofs, secrets and pub info satisfy a
pre-specified relation. msg can be any message. What knowledge is proven, depends on the spe-
cific instance of the proof and is captured by the verification functions for the specific proofs.
For example, to prove that a user knows (a) all fields of a (simplified) credential, (b) all fields
of a commitment to an identity, and (c) that the credential concerns the same identity as the
commitment, he generates the following proof:
spk((Idpt , Pnympt , rpt), (∗secrets∗)
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt ), commit(Idpt , rpt)), (∗public info∗)
msg). (∗message∗)
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These proofs are verified by checking that the signature is correct, given the signed message and
the verification information. E.g., the above example proof can be verified as follows:
reduc Vfy-spk( spk( (Idpt , Pnympt , rpt),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt ), commit(Idpt , rpt)),
msg ), (∗signed message∗)
( ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt ), commit(Idpt , rpt) ), (∗verify info∗)
msg (∗message∗)
) = true.
Other cryptographic primitives. Hash functions, encryptions and signing messages are mod-
elled by functions hash, enc, and sign, respectively (see Figure 11). Correspondingly, decryption,
verifying a signature and retrieving the message from a signature are modelled as functions dec,
Vfy-sign and getsignmsg (see Figure 12). Function pk models the corresponding public key of a
secret key, and function invoice is used for a pharmacist to generate an invoice for a patient (see
Figure 11). Functions getpublic, getSpkVinfo and getmsg model retrieving public information from
a zero-knowledge proof, from a signed proof of knowledge, and obtaining the message from a signed
proof of knowledge, respectively (see Figure 12). Function key models the public key of a user’s
identity and function host retrieves the owner’s identity from a public key (see Figure 12).
5.3 Modelling the DLV08 protocol
We first show how to model each of the sub-protocols and then how to compose them to form the
full DLV08 protocol.
Modelling the doctor-patient sub-protocol. This sub-protocol is used for a doctor, whose
steps are labelled di in Figure 14, to prescribe medicine for a patient, whose steps are labelled ti
in Figure 15.
Pdr :=
d1. out(ch, zk((Pnymdr , Iddr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ))).
d2. in(ch, (rcv Authpt , rcv PtProof )).
d3. let c Credpt = getpublic(rcv Authpt) in
d4. let (c Comtpt ,= c Credpt ) = getpublic(rcv PtProof ) in
d5. if Vfy-zkAuthpt (rcv Authpt , c Credpt ) = true then
d6. if Vfy-zkPtProof(rcv PtProof , (c Comtpt , c Credpt )) = true then
d7. νpresc.
d8. νrdr .
d9. let PrescriptID = hash(presc, c Comtpt , commit(Pnymdr , rdr )) in
d10. out(ch, (spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr )),
(presc,PrescriptID , commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), c Comtpt )),
rdr ))
Figure 14: The doctor process Pdr .
First, the doctor anonymously authenticates to the patient using credential Creddr (d1). The
patient reads in the doctor authentication (t1), obtains the doctor credential (t2), and verifies the
authentication (t3). If the verification in step (t3) succeeds, the patient anonymously authenti-
cates himself to the doctor using his credential (t5, the first zk function), generates a nonce rpt
(t4), computes a commitment with the nonce as opening information, and proves that the patient
identity used in the patient credential is the same as in the commitment, thus linking the patient
commitment and the patient credential (t5, the second zk).
32
P ′pt :=
t1. in(ch, rcv Authdr ).
t2. let c Creddr = getpublic(rcv Authdr) in
t3. if Vfy-zkAuthdr (rcv Authdr , c Creddr ) = true then
t4. νrpt .
t5. out(ch, (zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)),
zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(commit(Idpt , rpt),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc))))).
t6. in(ch, (rcv PrescProof , rcv rdr )).
t7. let (c presc, c PrescriptID , c Comtdr ,= commit(Idpt , rpt ))
= getmsg(rcv PrescProof ) in
t8. if Vfy-spkPrescProof(rcv PrescProof , (c Creddr , c presc,
c PrescriptID , c Comtdr , commit(Idpt , rpt))) = true then
t9. let c Pnymdr = open(c Comtdr , rcv rdr ) in P
′′
pt
Figure 15: The patient process in the doctor-patient sub-protocol P ′pt .
The doctor reads in the patient authentication as rcv Authpt and the patient proof as
rcv PtProof (d2), obtains the patient credential from the patient authentication (d3), obtains the
patient commitment c Comtpt and the patient credential from the patient proof, tests whether
the credential matches the one embedded in the patient authentication (d4), then verifies the
authentication (d5) and the patient proof (d6). If the verification in the previous item succeeds,
the doctor generates a prescription presc1 (d7), generates a nonce rdr (d8), computes a prescrip-
tion identity PrescriptID (d9), and computes a commitment Comtdr using the nonce as opening
information (d10). Next, the doctor signs the message (presc, PrescriptID , Comtdr , c Comtpt )
using a signed proof of knowledge. This proves the pseudonym used in the credential Creddr is the
same as in the commitment Comtdr , thus linking the prescription to the credential. The doctor
sends the signed proof of knowledge together with the open information of the doctor commitment
rdr (d10).
The patient reads in the prescription as rcv PrescProof and the opening information of the
doctor commitment (t6), obtains the prescription c presc, prescription identity c PrescriptID ,
doctor commitment c Comtdr , and tests the patient commitment signed in the receiving message
(t7). Then the patient verifies the signed proof of prescription (t8). If the verification succeeds,
the patient obtains the doctor’s pseudonym c Pnymdr by opening the doctor commitment (t9)
and continues the next sub-protocol behaving as in process P ′′pt .
Rationale for modelling of prescriptions. In the description of DLV08 protocol [dDLVV08],
it is unclear precisely what information is included in a prescription. Depending on the imple-
mentation, a prescription may contain various information, such as name of medicines prescribed,
amount of medicine prescribed, the timestamp and organization that wrote the prescription, etc.
Some information in the prescription may reveal privacy of patients and doctors. For instance,
if the identities of patients and doctors are included in the prescription, then doctor and patient
prescription privacy is trivially broken. In addition, both (doctor/patient) anonymity and un-
traceability would also be trivially broken, if the prescriptions were revealed to the adversary. In
order to focus only on the logical flaws of the DLV08 protocol and exclude such dependencies,
we assume that the prescriptions in the protocol are de-identified. However, this may not be
sufficient. Doctors may e.g. be identifiable by the way they prescribe, the order in which medicine
appear on prescriptions, etc. Such “fingerprinting” attacks would also trivially break prescription
privacy. For our analysis, we assume that a prescription cannot be linked to its doctor or patient
by its content. That is, the prescription shall not be modelled as a function of doctor or patient
1Note that a medical examination of the patient is not part of the DLV08 protocol.
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information. To avoid any of the above concerns, we model prescriptions as abstract pieces of
data: each prescription is represented by a single, unique name. First, this modelling captures
the assumption that prescriptions from different doctors are often different even for the same di-
agnose, due to different prescription styles. Second, this allows us to capture an infinite number
of prescriptions in infinite sessions, without introducing false attacks to the DLV08 protocol that
are caused by the modelling of the prescriptions.
Modelling the patient-pharmacist sub-protocol. This sub-protocol is used for a patient,
whose steps are labelled ti in Figure 16, to obtain medicine from a pharmacist, whose steps are
labelled hi in Figure 17.
P ′′pt :=
t10. in(ch, rcv Authph).
t11. if Vfy-sign(rcv Authph , rcvpt pkph ) = true then
t12. let (= cpt Idph , cpt Idmpa)
= getsignmsg(rcv Authph , rcvpt pkph ) in
t13. let cpt pkmpa = key(cpt Idmpa) in
t14. out(ch, zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), Sss))).
t15. νnonce.
t16. let vc1 = zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Hii, cpt pkmpa))) in
t17. let vc2 = zk((c Pnymdr , rcv rdr ),
(rcv PrescProof , enc(c Pnymdr , cpt pkmpa))) in
t18. let vc3 = zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Pnympt , pksso))) in
t19. let vc′3 = zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Hii, pksso))) in
t20. let vc4 = zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Pnympt , cpt pkmpa))) in
t21. let vc5 = zk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
enc(Pnympt , cpt pkhii ))) in
t22. let c5 = enc(vc5, cpt pkmpa) in
t23. out(ch, (rcv PrescProof , spk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), commit(Idpt , rpt)), nonce),
vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5)).
t24. in(ch, rcv Invoice).
t25. let ReceiptAck = spk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(c PrescriptID , cpt Idph , vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4, c5)) in
t26. out(ch,ReceiptAck)
Figure 16: The patient process in the patient-pharmacist sub-protocol P ′′pt .
First, the pharmacist authenticates to the patient using a public key authentication (h1). Note
that the pharmacist does not authenticate anonymously, and that the pharmacists’s MPA identity
is embedded. The patient reads in the pharmacist authentication rcv Authph (t10) and verifies
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P ′ph :=
h1. out(ch, sign((Idph , cph Idmpa), skph)).
h2. in(ch, rcv PtAuthSss).
h3. let (cph Credpt , cph Sss) = getpublic(rcv PtAuthSss) in
h4. if Vfy-zkPtAuthSss(rcv PtAuthSss, (cph Credpt , cph Sss))
= true then
h5. in(ch, (rcvph PrescProof , rcvph PtSpk ,
rcv vc1, rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4, rcv c5)).
h6. let (cph Comtdr , cph Creddr )
= getSpkVinfo(rcvph PrescProof ) in
h7. let (cph presc, cph PrescriptID ,= cph Comtdr , cph Comtpt )
= getmsg(rcvph PrescProof ) in
h8. if Vfy-spkPrescProof(rcvph PrescProof , (cph Creddr , cph presc,
cph PrescriptID , cph Comtdr , cph Comtpt )) = true then
h9. let c msg = getmsg(rcvph PtSpk) in
h10. if Vfy-spkPtSpk(rcvph PtSpk ,
(cph Credpt , cph Comtpt , c msg)) = true then
h11. let (= cph Credpt , c Enc1) = getpublic(rcv vc1) in
h12. if Vfy-vencHii(rcv vc1, (cph Credpt , c Enc1, rcvph pkmpa))
= true then
h13. let (= rcvph PrescProof , c Enc2) = getpublic(rcv vc2) in
h14. if Vfy-vencDrnymMpa(rcv vc2, (rcvph PrescProof ,
c Enc2, rcvph pkmpa)) = true then
h15. let (= cph Credpt , c Enc3) = getpublic(rcv vc3) in
h16. if Vfy-vencPtnym(rcv vc3, (cph Credpt , c Enc3, pksso))
= true then
h17. let (= cph Credpt , c Enc
′
3) = getpublic(rcv vc
′
3) in
h18. if Vfy-vencHii(rcv vc
′
3, (cph Credpt , c Enc
′
3, pksso)) = true then
h19. let (= cph Credpt , c Enc4) = getpublic(rcv vc4) in
h20. if Vfy-vencPtnym(rcv vc4,
(cph Credpt , c Enc4, rcvph pkmpa)) = true then
h21. out(ch, inv(cph PrescriptID)).
h22. in(ch, rcv ReceiptAck).
h23. if Vfy-spkReceiptAck(rcv ReceiptAck , (cph Credpt , cph PrescriptID ,
Idph , rcv vc1, rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4, rcv c5)) = true
then P ′′ph
Figure 17: The pharmacist process in the patient-pharmacist sub-protocol P ′ph .
the authentication (t11). If the verification succeeds, the pharmacist obtains the pharmacist’s
MPA identity from the authentication (t12), thus obtains the public key of MPA (t13). Then the
patient anonymously authenticates himself to the pharmacist, and proves his social security status
using the proof PtAuthSss (t14). The patient generates a nonce which will be used as a message
in a signed proof of knowledge (t15), and computes verifiable encryptions vc1, vc2, vc3, vc
′
3, vc4
and vc5 (t16-t21). These divulge the patient’s HII, the doctor’s pseudonym, and the patient’s
pseudonym to the MPA, the patient’s pseudonym to the HII, and the patient pseudonym and HII
to the social safety organisation, respectively. The patient encrypts vc5 with MPA’s public key as
c5 (t22). The patient computes a signed proof of knowledge
PtSpk = spk((Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc),
(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), commit(Idpt , rpt)),
nonce)
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which proves that the patient identity embedded in the prescription is the same as in his credential.
In the prescription, this identity is contained in a commitment. For simplicity, we model the proof
using the commitment instead of the prescription. The link between commitment and prescription
is ensured when the proof is verified (h10).
The patient sends the prescription rcv PrescProof , the signed proof PtSpk , and vc1, vc2, vc3,
vc′3, vc4, c5 to the pharmacist (t23). The pharmacist reads in the authentication rcv PtAuthSss
(h2), obtains the patient credential and his social security status (h3), verifies the authen-
tication (h4). If the verification succeeds, the pharmacist reads in the patient’s prescription
rcvph PrescProof , the signed proof of knowledge rcvph PtSpk , the verifiable encryptions rcv vc1,
rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4, and cipher text rcv c5 (h5); and verifies rcvph PrescProof (h6-
h8), rcvph PtSpk (h9-h10), and rcv vc1, rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4 (h11-h20). If all the
verifications succeed, the pharmacist charges the patient, and delivers the medicine (neither are
modelled as they are out of DLV08’s scope). Then the pharmacist generates an invoice with the
prescription identity embedded in it and sends the invoice to the patient (h21).
The patient reads in the invoice (t24), computes a receipt: a signed proof of knowledge
ReceiptAck which proves that he receives the medicine (t25); and sends the signed proof of knowl-
edge to the pharmacist (t26). The pharmacist reads in the receipt rcv ReceiptAck (h22), verifies
its correctness (h23) and continues the next sub-protocol behaving as in P ′′ph .
Modelling the pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol. The pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol is used
for the pharmacist, whose steps are labelled hi in Figure 18 to report the received prescriptions
to the MPA, whose steps are labelled mi in Figure 19.
P ′′ph :=
h24. out(ch, (sign((Idph , cph Idmpa), skph), Idph)).
h25. in(ch, rcv Authmpa).
h26. if Vfy-sign(rcv Authmpa , rcvph pkmpa) = true then
h27. out(ch, (rcvph PrescProof ,
rcv vc1, rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4, rcv c5,
rcv ReceiptAck))
Figure 18: The pharmacist process in the pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol P ′′ph .
As the pharmacist mostly forwards the information supplied by the patient, this protocol
greatly resembles the patient-pharmacist protocol described above. Each step is modelled in de-
tails as follows: The pharmacist authenticates himself to his MPA by sending his identity and
the signed identities of the pharmacist and the MPA (h24). The MPA stores this authentication
in rcvmpa Authph , and stores the pharmacist’s identity in cmpa Idph (m1). From the pharma-
cist’s identity, the MPA obtains the pharmacist’s public key (m2). Then the MPA verifies the
pharmacist’s authentication against the pharmacist’s public key (m3). If the verification succeeds,
according to the corresponding rule in the equational theory, and the MPA verifies that he is indeed
the pharmacist’s MPA (m4), the MPA then authenticates itself to the pharmacist by sending the
signature of his identity (m5). The pharmacist reads in the MPA’s authentication in rcv Authmpa
(h25), and verifies the authentication (h26). If the verification succeeds, the pharmacist sends
the following to the MPA: prescription rcvph PrescProof , received receipt rcv ReceiptAck , and
verifiable encryptions rcv vc1, rcv vc2, rcv vc3, rcv vc
′
3, rcv vc4, rcv c5 (h27). The MPA reads
in the information (m6) and verifies their correctness (m7-m24). If the verifications succeed, the
MPA decrypts the corresponding encryptions (cmpa Enc1, cmpa Enc2, and cmpa Enc4) embedded
in rcvmpa vc1, rcvmpa vc2, rcvmpa vc4, and obtains the patient’s HII (m12), the doctor pseudonym
(m15), the patient pseudonym (m23). Then the MPA continues the next sub-protocol behaving
as in process P ′mpa . The storing information to database by the MPA is beyond our concern.
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Pmpa :=
m1. in(ch, (rcvmpa Authph , cmpa Idph)).
m2. let rcvmpa pkph = key(cmpa Idph ) in
m3. if Vfy-sign(rcvmpa Authph , rcvmpa pkph ) = true then
m4. let (= cmpa Idph ,= Idmpa)
= getmsg(rcvmpa Authph , rcvmpa pkph ) in
m5. out(ch, sign(Idmpa , skmpa)).
m6. in(ch, (rcvmpa PrescProof , rcvmpa vc1, rcvmpa vc2, rcvmpa vc3,
rcvmpa vc
′
3, rcvmpa vc4, rcvmpa c5, rcvmpa ReceiptAck)).
m7. let (cmpa Comtdr , cmpa Creddr )
= getSpkVinfo(rcvmpa PrescProof ) in
m8. let (cmpa presc, cmpa PrescriptID ,= cmpa Comtdr , cmpa Comtpt )
= getmsg(rcvmpa PrescProof ) in
m9. if Vfy-spkPrescProof(rcvmpa PrescProof , (cmpa Creddr , cmpa presc,
cmpa PrescriptID , cmpa Comtdr , cmpa Comtpt )) = true then
m10. let (= cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc1) = getpublic(rcvmpa vc1) in
m11. if Vfy-vencHii(rcvmpa vc1,
(cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc1, pkmpa)) = true then
m12. let cmpa Hii = dec(cmpa Enc1, skmpa) in
m13. let (= rcvmpa PrescProof , cmpa Enc2)
= getpublic(rcvmpa vc2) in
m14. if Vfy-vencDrnymMpa(rcvmpa vc2,
(rcvmpa PrescProof , cmpa Enc2, pkmpa)) = true then
m15. let cmpa Pnymdr = dec(cmpa Enc2, skmpa) in
m16. let (= cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc3) = getpublic(rcvmpa vc3) in
m17. if Vfy-vencPtnym(rcvmpa vc3,
(cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc3, pksso)) = true then
m19. let (= cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc
′
3) = getpublic(rcvmpa vc
′
3) in
m20. if Vfy-vencHii(rcvmpa vc
′
3,
(cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc
′
3, pksso)) = true then
m21. let (= cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc4) = getpublic(rcvmpa vc4) in
m22. if Vfy-vencPtnym(rcvmpa vc4,
(cmpa Credpt , cmpa Enc4, pkmpa)) = true then
m23. let cmpa Pnympt = dec(cmpa Enc4, skmpa) in
m24. if Vfy-spkReceiptAck(rcvmpa ReceiptAck , (cmpa Credpt ,
cmpa PrescriptID , cmpa Idph , rcvmpa vc1, rcvmpa vc2,
rcvmpa vc3, rcvmpa vc
′
3, rcvmpa vc4, rcvmpa c5)) = true then P
′
mpa
Figure 19: The MPA process in the pharmacist-MPA sub-protocol Pmpa .
Modelling the MPA-HII sub-protocol. This protocol covers the exchange of information
between the pharmacist’s MPA, whose steps are labelled mi in Figure 20 and the patient’s HII,
whose steps are labelled ii in Figure 21.
The MPA sends his identity to the HII and authenticates to the HII using public key au-
thentication (m25). The HII stores the MPA’s identity in rcvhii Idmpa and stores the authenti-
cation in rcvhii Authmpa (i1). From the MPA’s identity, the HII obtains the MPA’s public key
(i2). Then the HII verifies the MPA’s authentication (i3). If the verification succeeds, the HII
authenticates to the MPA using public key authentication (i4). The MPA stores the authen-
tication in rcvmpa Authhii (m26). Then the MPA obtains the HII’s public key from the HII’s
identity (m27) and verifies the HII’s authentication (m28). If the verification succeeds, and the
MPA verifies that the authentication is from the intended HII (m29), the MPA sends the re-
ceipt rcvmpa PrescProof and the patient pseudonym encrypted for the HII – verifiable encryption
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P ′mpa :=
m25. out(ch, (sign(Idmpa , skmpa), Idmpa)).
m26. in(ch, rcvmpa Authhii).
m27. let cmpa pkhii = key(cmpa Hii) in
m28. if Vfy-sign(rcvmpa Authhii , cmpa pkhii ) = true then
m29. if getsignmsg(rcvmpa Authhii , cmpa pkhii ) = cmpa Hii then
m30. out(ch, (rcvmpa ReceiptAck , dec(rcvmpa c5, skmpa))).
m31. in(ch, rcvmpa Invoice)
Figure 20: The MPA process in the MPA-HII sub-protocol P ′mpa .
Phii :=
i1. in(ch, (rcvhii Authmpa , rcvhii Idmpa)).
i2. let chii pkmpa = key(rcvhii Idmpa) in
i3. if Vfy-sign(rcvhii Authmpa , chii pkmpa ) = true then
i4. out(ch, sign(Idhii , skhii )).
i5. in(ch, (rcvhii ReceiptAck , chii vc5)).
i6. let chii Credpt = getSpkVinfo(rcvhii ReceiptAck) in
i7. let (chii PrescriptID , chii Idph , chii vc1, chii vc2, chii vc3, chii vc
′
3,
chii vc4, chii c5) = getmsg(rcvhii ReceiptAck) in
i8. if Vfy-spkReceiptAck(rcvhii ReceiptAck , (chii Credpt ,
chii PrescriptID , chii Idph , chii vc1, chii vc2, chii vc3, chii vc
′
3,
chii vc4, chii c5)) = true then
i9. let (= chii Credpt , chii Enc5) = getpublic(chii vc5) in
i10. if Vfy-vencPtnym(chii vc5, (chii Credpt , chii Enc5, pkhii)) = true then
i11. let chii Pnympt = dec(chii Enc5, skhii ) in
i12. out(ch, invoice(chii PrescriptID))
Figure 21: The HII process Phii .
rcvmpa vc5 = dec(rcvmpa c5, skmpa) (m30). The HII receives the receipt as rcvhii ReceiptAck and
the encrypted patient pseudonym for the HII as chii vc5 (i5). The HII verifies the above two pieces
of information (i6-i10). If the verifications succeed, the HII decrypts the encryption chii Enc5
and obtains the patient’s pseudonym (i11). Finally, the HII sends an invoice of the prescription
identity to the MPA (i12). The MPA stores the invoice in rcvmpa Invoice (m31). Afterwards,
the HII pays the MPA and updates the patient account. As before, handling payment and storing
information are beyond the scope of the DLV08 protocol and therefore, we do not model this stage.
The full protocol. In summary, the DLV08 protocol is composed as shown in Figure 22. The
DLV08 protocol is modelled as the five roles Rdr , Rpt , Rph , Rmpa , and Rhii running in parallel
(Figure 23).
PDLV08 := νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii)
init := let pksso = pk(sksso) in out(ch, pksso)
where νm˜c represents global secrets sksso and private channels chhp, chmp, chphpt; process init
initialises the settings of the protocol – publishing the public key pksso , so that the adversary
knows it. The roles Rdr , Rpt , Rph , Rmpa and Rhii are obtained by adding the settings of each
role (see Section 4.3) to the previously modelled corresponding process of the role as shown in
Figure 24, Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27 and Figure 28, respectivley.
Each doctor has an identity Iddr (rd1), a pseudonym Pnymdr (rd2) and behaves like Pdr (rd3)
as shown in Figure 24. The anonymous doctor credential is modelled by applying function drcred
on Iddr and Pnymdr .
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Figure 22: Overview of DLV08 protocol.
PDLV08 := νsksso .νchhp.νchmp.νchphpt. } ν m˜c
let pksso = pk(sksso) in
out(ch, pksso).
}
init
(!(Rdr ) |!(Rpt) |!(Rph) |!(Rmpa) |!(Rhii))
Figure 23: The process for the DLV08 protocol.
Rdr :=
rd1. νIddr .
rd2. νPnymdr . } initdr
rd3. !(Pdr )
Figure 24: The process for role doctor Rdr .
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Each patient (as shown in Figure 25) has an identity Idpt (rt1), a pseudonym Pnympt , a social
security status Sss, a health expense account Acc (rt2). Unlike the identity and the pseudonym,
which are attributes of a doctor, a doctor’s Hii is an association relation, and thus is modelled
by reading in an HII identity to establish the relation (rt3). In addition, a patient communicates
with a pharmacist in each session. Which pharmacist the patient communicates with is decided
by reading in a pharmacist’s public key (rt4). From the pharmacist’s public key, the patient can
obtain the pharmacist’s identity (rt5). Finally the patient behaves as P ′pt (rt6).
Rpt :=
rt1. νIdpt .
rt2. νPnympt .νSss.νAcc.
rt3. in(chhp, Hii).let cpt pkhii = key(Hii) in
}
initpt
rt4. !(in(chphpt, rcv pkph).
rt5. let rcvpt pkph = rcv pkph in let Idph = host(rcv pkph ) in
rt6. P ′pt )

!(Ppt )
Figure 25: The process for role patient Rpt .
Each pharmacist has a secret key skph (rh1), a public key pkph (rh2) and an identity Idph
(rh3) as shown in Figure 26. The public key of a pharmacist is published over channel ch, so
that the adversary knows it (rh4). In addition, the public key is sent to the patients via private
channel chphpt (rh4), so that the patients can choose one to communicate with. In each session,
the pharmacist communicates with an MPA. Which MPA the pharmacist communicates with is
decided by reading in a public key of MPA (rh5). From the public key, the pharmacist can obtain
the identity of the MPA (rh6). Finally, the pharmacist behave as P ′ph .
Rph :=
rh1. νskph .
rh2. let pkph = pk(skph) in
rh3. let Idph = host(pkph) in
rh4. out(ch, pkph).out(chphpt, pkph).

 initph
rh5. !(in(chmp, rcvph pkmpa).
rh6. let cph Idmpa = host(rcvph pkmpa) in P
′
ph)
}
!(Pph )
Figure 26: The process for role pharmacist Rph .
Each MPA has a secret key skmpa (rm1), a public key pkmpa (rm2) and an identity Idmpa
(rm3). The MPA publishes his public key as well as sends his public key to pharmacists (rm4),
and behaves as Pmpa (rm5) as shown in Figure 27.
Rmpa :=
rm1. νskmpa .
rm2. let pkmpa = pk(skmpa) in
rm3. let Idmpa = host(pkmpa) in
rm4. out(ch, pkmpa).out(chmp, pkmpa).

 initmpa
rm5. !(Pmpa)
Figure 27: The process for role MPA Rmpa .
Similar to MPA, each HII (Figure 28) has a secret key skhii (ri1), a public key pkhii (ri2) and
an identity Idhii (ri3). The public key is revealed to the adversary via channel ch and sent to the
patients via channel chhp (ri4). Then the HII behaves as Phii (ri5).
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Rhii :=
ri1. νskhii .
ri2. let pkhii = pk(skhii ) in
ri3. let Idhii = host(pkhii) in
ri4. out(ch, pkhii).out(chhp, Idhii).

 inithii
ri5. !(Phii )
Figure 28: The process for role HII Rhii .
6 Analysis of DLV08
In this section, we analyse whether DLV08 satisfies the following properties:
• secrecy of patient and doctor information,
• authentication,
• (strong) patient and doctor anonymity,
• (strong) patient and doctor untraceability,
• (enforced) prescription privacy, and
• independence of (enforced) prescription privacy.
The properties doctor anonymity and untraceability are not required by the protocol but are
still interesting to analyse. The verification is supported by the automatic verification tool
ProVerif [Bla01, Bla02, Bla04]. The tool has been used to verify many secrecy, authentication and
privacy properties, e.g., see [AB05, ABF07, LCPD07, BC08, DJP11]. The verification results for
secrecy are summarised in Table 1, and those for authentication in Table 2. As we are foremost
interested in privacy properties, the verification results for privacy properties, and suggestions
for improvements are discussed in Section 7. Table 5 summarises those results, causes of privacy
weaknesses, suggested improvements, and the effect of the improvements. In this section, we show
the verification results of properties from basic to more complicated. A flaw which fails a basic
property is likely to fail a more complicated property as well. Thus we first show flaws of basic
properties and how to fix them, then we show new flaws of complicated properties based on the
fixed model.
6.1 ProVerif
ProVerif takes a protocol and a property modelled in the applied pi calculus as input (the input
language (untyped version) differs slightly from applied pi, see [Bla]), and returns either a proof
of correctness or potential attacks. A protocol modelled in the applied pi calculus is translated to
Horn clauses [Hor51]. The adversary’s capabilities are added as Horn clauses as well. Using these
clauses, verification of secrecy and authentication is equivalent to determining whether a certain
clause is derivable from the set of initial clauses.
Secrecy of a term is defined as the adversary cannot obtain the term by communicating with the
protocol and/or applying cryptography on the output of the protocol [AB05]. The secrecy property
is modelled as a predicate in ProVerif: the query of secrecy of term M is “attacker :M” [Bla01].
ProVerif determines whether the term M can be inferred from the Horn clauses representing the
adversary knowledge.
Authentication is captured by correspondence properties of events in processes: if one event
happens the other event must have happened before [ABF07, Bla09]. Events are tags which
mark important stages reached by the protocol. Events have arguments, which allow us to express
relationships between the arguments of events. A correspondence property is a formula of the form:
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ev : f¯(M) ==> ev : g¯(N). That is, in any process, if event f¯(M) has been executed, then the
event g¯(N) must have been previously executed, and any relationship between M and N must be
satisfied. To capture stronger authentication, where an injective relationship between executions
of participants is required, an injective correspondence property evinj : f¯(M) ==> evinj : g¯(N)
is defined: in any process, for each execution of event f¯(M), there is a distinct earlier execution
of the event g¯(N), and the relationship between M and N is satisfied.
In addition, ProVerif provides automatic verification of labelled bisimilarity of two processes
which differ only in the choice of some terms [BAF08]. An operation “choice[a, b]” is introduced to
model the different choices of a term in the two processes. Using this operation, the two processes
can be written as one process – a bi-process.
Example 8. To verify the equivalence
νa.νb.out(ch, a).out(ch, e) ≈ℓ νa.νb.out(ch, b).out(ch, d)
where ch is a public channel, e and d are two free names, we can query the following bi-process in
ProVerif:
P := νa.νb.out(ch, choice[a, b]).out(ch, choice[e, d]).
Using the first parameter of all “choice” operations in a bi-process P , we obtain one side of the
equivalence (denoted as fst(P)); using the second parameters, we obtain the other side (denoted
as snd(P)).
Example 9. For the bi-process in Example 8, using the first parameter to replace each “choice”
operation, we obtain
νa.νb.out(ch, a).out(ch, e),
which is the left-hand side of the equivalence in Example 8; using the second parameter to replace
each “choice” operation, we obtain
νa.νb.out(ch, b).out(ch, d),
which is the right-hand side of the equivalence.
Given a bi-process P , ProVerif tries to prove that fst(P) is labelled bisimilar to snd(P). The
fundamental idea is that ProVerif reasons on traces of the bi-process P : the bi-process P reduces
when fst(P) and snd(P) reduce in the same way; when fst(P) and snd(P) do something that
may differentiate them, the bi-process is stuck. Formally, ProVerif shows that the bi-process P is
uniform, that is, if fst(P) can do a reduction to some Q1, then the bi-process can do a reduction
to some bi-process Q , such that fst(Q) ≡ Q1 and symmetrically for snd(P) taking a reduction to
Q2. When the bi-process P always remains uniform after reduction and addition of an adversary,
fst(P) is labelled bisimilar to snd(P).
6.2 Secrecy of patient and doctor information
The DLV08 protocol claims to satisfy the following requirement: any party involved in the pre-
scription processing workflow should not know the information of a patient and a doctor unless
the information is intended to be revealed in the protocol. In [dDLVV08], this requirement is
considered as an access control requirement. We argue that ensuring the requirement with access
control is not sufficient when considering a communication network. A dishonest party could
potentially act as an attacker from the network (observing the network and manipulating the pro-
tocol) and obtain information which he should not access. It is not clearly stated which (if any) of
the involved parties are honest. We find that in such a way, some patient and doctor information
may be revealed to parties who should not know the information.
We formalise the requirement as standard secrecy of patient and doctor information with re-
spect to the Dolev-Yao adversary. Standard secrecy of a term captures the idea that the adversary
cannot access to that term (see Section 6.1). If a piece of information is known to the adversary,
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checked Security property initial model cause(s) improvement
Secrecy of Idpt
√
Secrecy of Pnympt
√
Secrecy of Sss × revealed session key
Secrecy of Hii
√
Secrecy of Acc
√
Secrecy of Iddr
√
Secrecy of Pnymdr × revealed session key
Table 1: Verification results of secrecy for patients and doctors.
a dishonest party acting like the adversary can access to the information. We do not consider
strong secrecy, as it is unclear whether the information is guessable. Recall that standard secrecy
of a term M is formally defined as a predicate “attacker : M” (see Section 6.1). By replacing
M with the listed private information, we obtain the formal definition of the secrecy of patient
and doctor information. The list of private information of patients and doctors that needs to be
protected is: patient identity (Idpt ), doctor identity (Iddr ), patient pseudonym (Pnympt ), doctor
pseudonym (Pnymdr ), a patient’s social security status (Sss), and a patient’s health insurance
institute (Hii). Although DLV08 does not explicitly require it, we additionally analyse secrecy of
the health expense account Acc of a patient.
query attacker : Idpt query attacker : Iddr query attacker : Pnympt
query attacker : Pnymdr query attacker : Sss query attacker : Hii
query attacker : Acc
Verification result. We query the standard secrecy of the set of private information using
ProVerif [Bla01]. The verification results (see Table 1) show that a patient’s identity, pseudonym,
health expense account, health insurance institute and identity of a doctor (Idpt , Pnympt , Hii Acc,
Iddr ) satisfy standard secrecy; a patient’s social security status Sss and a doctor’s pseudonym
Pnymdr do not satisfy standard secrecy. The Sss is revealed by the proof of social security status
from the patient to the pharmacist. The Pnymdr is revealed by the revealing of both the commit-
ment of the patient’s pseudonym and the open key to the commitment during the communication
between the patient and the doctor.
Fixing secrecy of a patient’s social security status requires that the proof of social security status
only reveals the status to the pharmacist. Since how a social security status is represented and
what the pharmacist needs to verify are not clear, we cannot give explicit suggestions. However,
if the social security status is a number, and the pharmacist only needs to verify that the number
is higher than a certain threshold, the patient can prove it using zero-knowledge proof without
revealing the number; if the pharmacist needs to verify the exact value of the status, one way
to fix its secrecy is that the pharmacist and the patient agree on a session key and the status is
encrypted using the key. Similarly, a way to fix the secrecy of Pnymdr is to encrypt the opening
information using the agreed session key.
6.3 Patient and doctor authentication
The protocol claims that all parties should be able to properly authenticate each other. Compared
to authentications between public entities, pharmacists, MPA and HII, we focus on authentications
between patients and doctors, as patients and doctors use anonymous authentication. Authenti-
cations between patients and pharmacists are sketched as well.
The DLV08 claims that no party should be able to succeed in claiming a false identity, or false
information about his identity. That is the adversary cannot pretend to be a patient or a doctor.
Authentication from a patient to a doctor. The authentication from a patient to a doctor
is defined as when the doctor finishes his process and believes that he prescribed medicine for a pa-
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tient, then the patient did ask the doctor for prescription. To verify the authentication of a patient,
we add an event EndDr(c Credpt , c Comtpt ) at the end of the doctor process (after line d10), mean-
ing the doctor believes that he prescribed medicine for a patient who has a credential c Credpt and
committed c Comtpt ; and add an event StartPt(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc), commit(Idpt , rpt))
in the patient process (between line t4 and line t5), meaning that the patient did ask for a
prescription. The definition is captured by the following correspondence property: ev(inj ) :
EndDr(x, y) ==> ev(inj ) : StartPt(x, y), meaning that when the event EndDr is executed, there is
a (unique) event StartPt has been executed before.
Authentication from a doctor to a patient. Similarly, the authentication from a doc-
tor to a patient is defined as when the patient believes that he visited a doctor, the doctor
did prescribe medicine for the patient. To authenticate a doctor, we add to the patient pro-
cess an event EndPt(c Creddr , c Comtdr , c presc, c PrescriptID) (after line t9), and add an event
StartDr(drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr ), commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), presc,PrescriptID) in the doctor process (be-
tween line d9 and line d10), then query ev(inj ) : EndPt(x, y, z, t) ==> ev(inj ) : StartDr(x, y, z, t).
Authentication from a patient to a pharmacist. The authentication from a patient to
a doctor is defined as when the pharmacist finishes a session and believes that he communi-
cates with a patient, who is identified with the credential cph Credpt , then the patient with the
credential did communicate with the pharmacist. to verify the authentication of a patient, we
add to the pharmacist process the event EndPh(cph Credpt ) (after line h23), add to the patient
process StartPtph(ptcred(Idpt , Pnympt , Hii, Sss, Acc)) (between line t13 and line t14), and query
ev(inj ) : EndPh(x) ==> ev(inj ) : StartPtph(x).
Authentication from a pharmacist to a patient. The authentication from a pharmacist to
a patient is defined as when the patient finishes a session and believes that he communicates with
a pharmacist with the identity cpt Idph , then the pharmacist is indeed the one who communicated
with the patient. To verify this authentication, we add the event EndPtph(cpt Idph ) into the patient
process (after line t26), add the event StartPh(Idph) into the pharmacist process (between line h1
and line h2), and query ev(inj ) : EndPtph(x) ==> ev(inj ) : StartPh(x). In addition, we add the
conditional evaluation if rcv Invoice = inv(c PrescriptID) then before the end EndPtph(cpt Idph )
in the patient process to capture that the patient checks the correctness of the invoice.
Verification results. The queries are verified using ProVerif. The verification results show that
doctor authentication, both injective and non-injective, succeed; non-injective patient authentica-
tion succeeds and injective patient authentication fails. The failure is caused by a replay attack
from the adversary. That is, the adversary can impersonate a patient by replaying old messages
from the patient. This authentication flaw leads to termination of the successive procedure, the
patient-pharmacist sub-process. We verified authentication between patients and pharmacists as
well. Non-injective patient authentication succeeds, whereas injective patient authentication fails.
This means that the messages received by a pharmacist are from the correct patient, but not
necessarily from this communication session. Neither non-injective nor injective pharmacist au-
thentication succeeds: the adversary can record and replay the first message which is sent from
a pharmacist to a patient, and pass the authentication by pretending to be that pharmacist.
In addition, the adversary can prepare the second message sending from a pharmacist to a pa-
tient, and thus does not need to replay the second message. Since the adversary alters messages,
non-injective pharmacist authentication fails. The verification results are summarised in Table 2.
The reason that injective patient authentication fails for both doctors and pharmacists is that
they suffer from replay attacks. One possible solution approach is to add a challenge sent from
the doctor (respectively, the pharmacist) to the patient. Then, when the patient authenticates to
the doctor or pharmacist, the patient includes this challenge in the proofs. This approach assures
that the proof is freshly generated. Therefore, this prevents the adversary replaying old messages.
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checked Auth initial model cause(s) improvement
dr to pt (inject)
√
dr to pt (non-inject)
√
pt to dr (inject) × replay attack add challenge
pt to dr (non-inject)
√
ph to pt (inject) × adv. can replay 1st message, sign the invoice
compute 2nd message
ph to pt (non-inject) × adv. can replay 1st message, sign the invoice
compute 2nd message
pt to ph (inject) × replay attack add challenge
pt to ph (non-inject)
√
Table 2: Verification results of authentication of patients and doctors.
The reason that (injective and non-injective) authentication from a pharmacist to a patient
fails is that the adversary can generate an invoice to replace the one from the real pharmacist.
One solution is for the pharmacist to sign the invoice.
Authentications between public entities. The public entities – pharmacists, MPAs, HIIs,
authenticate each other using public key authentication. The authentication is often used to agree
on a way for the later communication. Since it is not mentioned in the original protocol that a key
or a communication channel is established during authentication, we assume that the later message
exchanges are over public channels, to model the worst case. In this model, the authentications
between public entities are obviously flawed, since the adversary can reuse messages from other
sessions. The flaws are confirmed by the verification results using ProVerif.
6.4 (Strong) patient and doctor anonymity
The DLV08 protocol claims that no party should be able to determine the identity of a patient.
We define (strong) patient anonymity to capture the requirement. Note that in the original paper
of the DLV08 protocol, the terminology of the privacy property for capturing this requirement is
patient untraceability. Our definition of untraceability (Definition 12) has different meaning from
theirs (for details, see Section 6.5). Also note that the satisfaction of standard secrecy of patient
identity does not fully capture this requirement, as the adversary can still guess about it.
Patient and doctor anonymity. Doctor anonymity is defined as in Definition 8. Patient
anonymity can be defined in a similar way by replacing the role of doctor with the role of patient.
Ceh [initpt{tA/Idpt}.!Ppt{tA/Idpt}] ≈ℓ Ceh [initpt{tB/Idpt}.!Ppt{tB/Idpt}].
To verify doctor/patient anonymity, is to check the satisfiability of the corresponding equivalence
between processes in the definition. This is done by modelling the two processes on two sides of
the equivalence as a bi-process, and verify the bi-process using ProVerif. Recall that a bi-process
models two processes sharing the same structure and differing only in terms or destructors. The
two processes are written as one process with choice-constructors which tells ProVerif the spots
where the two processes differ. The bi-process for verifying doctor anonymity is
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii | (νPnymdr .let Iddr = choice[dA, dB] in !Pdr ),
and the bi-process for verifying patient anonymity is
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii | (let Idpt = choice[tA, tB] in
νPnympt .νSss.νAcc.in(chhp, Hii).let cpt pkhii = key(Hii) in !Ppt ).
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Since the doctor identity is a secret information, we define dA and dB as private names private free dA.
private free dB. In addition, we consider a stronger version, in which the adversary knows the two
doctor identities a priori, i.e., we verify whether the adversary can distinguish two known doctors
as well. This is modelled by defining the two doctor identities as free names, free dA.free dB.
Similarly, we verified two versions of patient anonymity - in one version, the adversary does not
know the two patient identities, and in the other version, the adversary initially knows the two
patient identities.
Strong patient and doctor anonymity. Strong doctor anonymity is defined as in Definition 9.
By replacing the role of doctor with the role of patient, we obtain the definition of strong patient
anonymity. The bi-process for verifying strong doctor anonymity is
free dA;
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νdB.νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = choice[dB, dA] in Pdr ))),
and the bi-process for verifying strong patient anonymity is
free tA;
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii | (νtB.νPnympt .νSss.νAcc.
in(chhp, Hii).let cpt pkhii = key(Hii) in !(let Idpt = choice[tB, tA] in Ppt ))).
Note that by definition, the identities dA and tB is known by the adversary.
In the first bi-process, by choosing dB, we obtain
free dA;
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νdB.νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dB in Pdr ))).
Since dA never appears in the remaining process, removing the declaration “free dA;” does not
affect the process. Since process “νdB.νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dB in Pdr )”
essentially renames the doctor role process “Rdr” (Figure 24) - renaming Iddr as dB and renaming
Pnymdr as nPnymdr , we have that the above process is structurally equivalent to (using rule REPL)
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii),
which is the left-hand side of Definition 9 - the PDLV08 in the case study.
On the other hand, by choosing dA, we obtain process
free dA;
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νdB.νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dA in Pdr ))).
Since dB only appears in the sub-process “νdB.” which generates dB and never appears in the
remaingin process, the process is structurally equivalent to (applying rule NEW− PAR)
free dA;
νdB.νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dA in Pdr ))).
The above process is structurally equivalent to (proved later)
free dA;
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dA in Pdr ))),
which is the right-hand side of Definition 9, where dA is a free name. This structural equivalent
relation is proved as follows.
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Proof. Assuming the above process is P (i.e., P = νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νnPnymdr .let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in !(let Iddr = dA in Pdr )))), by applying rule PAR− 0, we have
P ≡ P | 0. By rule NEW − 0, νdB.0 ≡ 0. Thus, P ≡ P | νdB.0. Since dB never appears in the
process P , i.e., dB 6∈ fn(P ) ∪ fv(P ), by applying rule NEW− PAR, we have P | νdB.0 ≡ νdB.(P |
0) ≡ νdB.P . Therefore, P ≡ νdB.P .
Verification result. The bi-processes are verified using ProVerif. The verification results show
that patient anonymity (with and without revealed patient identities a priori) and strong patient
anonymity are satisfied; doctor anonymity is satisfied; neither doctor anonymity with revealed
doctor identities nor strong doctor anonymity is satisfied.
For strong doctor anonymity, the adversary can distinguish a process initiated by an unknown
doctor and a known doctor. Given a doctor process, where the doctor has identity dA, pseudonym
Pnymdr , and credential drcred(Pnymdr , dA), the terms Pnymdr and drcred(Pnymdr , dA) are revealed.
We assume that the adversary knows another doctor identity dB. The adversary can fake an anony-
mous authentication by faking the zero-knowledge proof as zk((Pnymdr , dB), drcred(Pnymdr , dA)). If
the zero-knowledge proof passes the corresponding verification Vfy-zkAuthdr by the patient, then
the adversary knows that the doctor process is executed by the doctor dB. Otherwise, not.
For the same reason, doctor anonymity fails the verification. Both flaws can be fixed by
requiring a doctor to generate a new credential in each session (s4’).
6.5 (Strong) patient and doctor untraceability
Even if a user’s identity is not revealed, the adversary may be able to trace a user by telling
whether two executions are done by the same user. The DLV08 protocol claims that prescriptions
issued to the same patient should not be linkable to each other. In other words, the situation
in which a patient executes the protocol twice should be indistinguishable from the situation in
which two different patients execute the protocol individually. To satisfy this requirement, patient
untraceability is required. (Remark that the original DLV08 paper calls this untraceability “patient
unlinkability”.)
Patient and doctor untraceability. Doctor untraceability has been defined in Definition 12,
and patient untraceability can be defined in a similar style. The bi-process for verifying doctor
untraceability is
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii | (νnPnymdr .νwPnymdr .
((let Iddr = dA in let Pnymdr = nPnymdr in Pdr ) |
(let Iddr = choice[dA, dB] in let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in Pdr )))),
and the bi-process for verifying patient untraceability is
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |
(νnPnympt .νnSss.νnAcc.νwPnympt .νwSss.νwAcc.
in(chhp, nHii).in(chhp,wHii).
let cpt npkhii = key(nHii) in let cpt wpkhii = key(wHii) in
(let Hii = nHii in let cpt pkhii = cpt npkhii in let Idpt = tA in
let Pnympt = nPnympt in let Sss = nSss in let Acc = nAcc in Ppt ) |
(let Hii = choice[nHii ,wHii ] in let cpt pkhii = choice[cpt npkhii , cpt wpkhii ] in
let Idpt = choice[tA, tB] in let Pnympt = choice[nPnympt , wPnympt ] in
let Sss = choice[nSss, wSss] in let Acc = choice[nAcc, wAcc] in Ppt ))).
We verified two versions of doctor and patient untraceability, - in one version, the adversary does
not know the two doctor/patient identities, and in the other version, the adversary initially knows
the two doctor/patient identities.
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Strong patient and doctor untraceability. Strong untraceability is modelled as a patient
executing the protocol repeatedly is indistinguishable from different patients executing the pro-
tocol each once. Strong doctor untraceability is defined as in Definition 13 and strong patient
untraceability can be defined in the same manner. The bi-process for verifying strong doctor
untraceability is
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |!(νnIddr .νnPnymdr .!(νwIddr .νwPnymdr .
let Iddr = choice[nIddr , wIddr ] in let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in Pdr ))),
and the bi-process for verifying strong patient untraceability is
νm˜c.init .(!Rdr |!Rph |!Rmpa |!Rhii |!(νnIdpt .νnPnympt .νnSss.νnAcc.in(chhp, nHii).
!(νwIdpt .νwPnympt .νwSss.νwAcc.
let Idpt = choice[nIdpt , wIdpt ] in let Pnympt = choice[nPnympt , wPnympt ] in
let Sss = choice[nSss, wSss] in let Acc = choice[nAcc, wSss] in
in(chhp,wHii).let Hii = choice[nHii ,wHii ] in let cpt pkhii = key(Hii) in Ppt ))).
This definition does not involve a specific doctor/patient, and thus needs not to distinguish whether
the adversary knows the identities a priori.
Verification result. The bi-processes are verified using ProVerif. The verification results show
that the DLV08 protocol does not satisfy patient/doctor untraceability (with/without revealed
identities), nor strong untraceability.
The strong doctor untraceability fail, because the adversary can distinguish sessions initiated
by one doctor and by different doctors. The doctor’s pseudonym is revealed and a doctor uses the
same pseudonym in all sessions. Sessions with the same doctor pseudonyms are initiated by the
same doctor. For the same reasons, doctor untraceability without revealing doctor identities also
fails. Both of them can be fixed by requiring the representation of a doctor’s pseudonym (Sss)
differ in each session (s3’).
However, assuming s3’ (doctor pseudonym is fresh in every sessions) is not sufficient for sat-
isfying doctor anonymity with doctor identities revealed. The adversary can still distinguish two
sessions initiated by one doctor or by two different doctors, by comparing the anonymous authen-
tications of the two sessions. From the communication in the two sessions, the adversary is able
to learn two doctor pseudonyms Pnymdr
′ and Pnymdr
′′, two doctor credentials Creddr
′ and Creddr
′′
and two anonymous authentications Authdr
′ and Authdr
′′. Since the adversary knows dA and dB in
advance, he could construct the eight anonymous authentications by applying the zero-knowledge
proof function, i.e., zk((Pnymdr , Iddr ),Creddr ), where Pnymdr = Pnymdr
′ or Pnymdr = Pnymdr
′′,
Iddr = dA or Iddr = dB, Creddr = Creddr
′ or Creddr = Creddr
′. By comparing the constructed
anonymous authentications with the observed ones, the adversary is able to tell who generated
which anonymous authentication, and thus is able to tell whether the two sessions are initiated by
the same doctor or different doctors. This can be fixed by additionally requiring that the doctor
anonymous authentication differs in every session (s4’).
For strong patient untraceability, the adversary can distinguish sessions initiated by one pa-
tient (with identical social security statuses) and initiated by different patients (with different
social security statuses). Second, the adversary can distinguish sessions initiated by one patient
(with identical cipher texts enc(Pnympt , pksso) and identical cipher texts enc(Hii, pksso)) and initi-
ated by different patients (with different cipher texts enc(Pnympt , pksso) and different cipher texts
enc(Hii, pksso)). Third, since the patient credential is the same in all sessions and is revealed,
the adversary can also trace a patient by the patient’s credential. Fourth, the adversary can
distinguish sessions using the same HII and sessions using different HIIs. For the same reasons,
patient untraceability fails. Both flaws can be fixed by requiring that the representation of a pa-
tient’s social security status to be different in each session (s5’), the encryptions are probabilistic
(s2’), a patient freshly generates a credential in each session (s4”), and patients who shall not be
distinguishable share the same HII (s6’).
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6.6 Prescription privacy
Prescription privacy has been defined in Definition 3. To verify the prescription privacy is to check
the satisfaction of the equivalence in the definition. The bi-process for verifying the equivalence is
(private)free dA.(private)free dB.free pA.free pB.
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!Rph | (νnPnymdr .νwPnymdr .
let Iddr = choice[dA, dB] in
let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in
let presc = pA in maindr ) |
(νnPnymdr .νwPnymdr .
let Iddr = choice[dB, dA] in
let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in
let presc = pB in maindr )).
Similarly, we verified two versions - in one version, the adversary does not know dA and dB, and in
the other, the adversary knows dA and dB.
Verification result. The verification, using ProVerif, shows that the DLV08 protocol satisfies
prescription privacy when the adversary does not know the doctor identities a priori, and does
not satisfy prescription privacy when the adversary knows the doctor identities a priori, i.e., the
adversary can distinguish whether a prescription is prescribed by doctor dA or doctor dB, given
the adversary knows dA and dB. In the prescription proof, a prescription is linked to a doctor
credential. And a doctor credential is linked to a doctor identity. Thus, the adversary can link a
doctor to his prescription. To break the link, one way is to make sure that the adversary cannot
link a doctor credential to a doctor identity. This can be achieved by adding randomness to the
credential (s4’).
6.7 Receipt-freeness
The definition of receipt-freeness is modelled as the existence of a process P ′dr , such that the two
equivalences in Definition 4 are satisfied. Due to the existential quantification, we cannot verify
the property directly using ProVerif.
Examining the DLV08 protocol, we find an attack on receipt-freeness, even with assumption
s4’ (after fixing prescription privacy with doctor ID revealed). A bribed doctor is able to prove
to the adversary of his prescription as follows:
1. A doctor communicates with the adversary to agree on a bit-commitment that he will use,
which links the doctor to the commitment.
2. The doctor uses the agreed bit-commitment in the communication with his patient. This
links the bit-commitment to a prescription.
3. Later, when the patient uses this prescription to get medicine from a pharmacist, the ad-
versary can observe the prescription being used. This proves that the doctor has really
prescribed the medicine.
We formally confirm the attack using ProVerif, i.e., we show that in the protocol model, if a
doctor reveals all his information to the adversary, the doctor’s prescription privacy is broken.
The same attack exists for multi-session receipt-freeness as well – a bribed doctor is able to prove
his prescriptions by agreeing with the adversary on the bit-commitments in each session.
Theorem 1 (receipt-freeness). The DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy receipt-freeness under both
the standard assumption s4 (a doctor has the same credential in every session), and also under
assumption s4’ (a doctor generates a new credential for each session).
Formal proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix A.
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6.8 Independency of (enforced) prescription privacy
To determine whether the doctor’s prescription privacy is independent of the pharmacist, we
replace regular pharmacist role Ri with collaborating role Rph in Definition 6. The bi-process for
verifying the property is:
(private)free dA.(private)free dB.free pA.free pB.
νm˜c.init .(!Rpt |!Rdr |!(Rph )chc | (νnPnymdr .νwPnymdr .
let Iddr = choice[dA, dB] in
let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in
let presc = pA in maindr ) |
(νnPnymdr .νwPnymdr .
let Iddr = choice[dB, dA] in
let Pnymdr = choice[nPnymdr , wPnymdr ] in
let presc = pB in maindr )).
Verification using ProVerif shows that the protocol (the original version where the adversary does
not know dA and dB, and the version after fixing the flaw on prescription privacy with assumption
s4’ where the adversary knows dA and dB) satisfies this property.
The case of pharmacist-independent receipt-freeness is treated analogously. We replace regular
pharmacist Ri with Rph in Definition 7. The flaw described in Section 6.7 also surfaces here.
This was expected: when a doctor can prove his prescription without the pharmacist sharing
information with the adversary, the doctor can also prove this when the pharmacist genuinely
cooperates with the adversary.
6.9 Dishonest users
So far, we have considered security and privacy with respect to a Dolev-Yao style adversary (see
Section 3.3). The initial knowledge of the adversary was modelled such, that the adversary could
not take an active part in the execution of the protocol. This constitutes the basic DY adversary,
as shown in Table 3. In more detail, for secrecy of private doctor and patient information (see
Table 1), [dDLVV08] claims that no third party (including the basic DY adversary) shall be
able to know a patient’s or doctor’s private information (refer to the beginning of Section 4).
Similarly, the verification of authentication properties in Table 2 is also with respect to the basic
DY adversary. This captures that no third party that does not participate in the execution shall
be able to impersonate any party (involved in the execution). The same basic DY adversary
model is used to verify anonymity, untraceability and prescription privacy. The exceptions are
(1) for verifying receipt-freeness and independency of enforced prescription privacy, the basic DY
adversary is extended with information from the targeted doctor; (2) for verifying independency
of prescription privacy and independency of enforced prescription privacy, the basic DY adversary
is extended with information from pharmacists.
Properties Adversary
Secrecy, Authentication, basic DY
Anonymity, Untraceability, Prescription privacy
Receipt-freeness basic DY + info. from doctor
Independency of prescription privacy basic DY + info. from pharmacy
Independency of enforced prescription privacy basic DY + info. from doctor and pharmacy
Table 3: Summary of the respected adversary
In this section, we consider dishonest users, that is, malicious users that collaborate with the
adversary and are part of the execution, into consideration. For each property previously verified,
we analyse the result once again with respect to each dishonest role.
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Dishonest users are modelled by providing the adversary certain initial knowledge such that
the adversary can take part in the protocol. To execute the protocol as a doctor, i.e., to instantiate
the doctor process Pdr , the adversary only needs to have an identity and a pseudonym. Since the
adversary is able to generate data, the adversary can create his own identity Idadr and pseudonym
Idadr . However, this is not sufficient, because an legitimate doctor has a credential issued by
authorities. The credential is captured by the private function drcred. The adversary cannot
obtain this credential, since he cannot apply the function drcred. When the function drcred is
modelled as public, the adversary is able to obtain his credential drcred(Idadr , Id
a
dr ), and thus has
the ability to behave like a doctor. Hence, by modelling the function drcred as public, we allow
the adversary to have the ability of dishonest doctors. Note that an honest doctor’s identity is
secret (see Table 1). The attacker thus cannot forge credentials of honest doctors, as the doctor’s
identity must be known for this. Thus, making the function drcred public does not bestow extra
power on the attacker.
Similarly, by allowing the adversary to have patient credentials, we strengthen the adversary
with the ability to control dishonest patients. This is modelled by changing the private functions
ptcred to be public.
Each public entity (pharmacist, MPA or HII) has a secret key as distinct identifier, i.e., its
public key and identity can be derived from the secret key. The adversary can create such a secret
key by himself. However, only the legitimate entities can participate in the protocol. This is
modelled using private channels – only the honest entities are allowed to publish their information
to the channels, and participants only read in entities, which they are going to communicate with,
from the private channels. By changing the private channels to be public, the adversary is able
to behave as dishonest public entities. Note that when considering the adversary only controlling
dishonest pharmacists among the public entities, for the sake of simplicity of modelling, a dishonest
pharmacist is modelled as Rchcph (same as in independency of prescription privacy) in which the
pharmacist shares all his information with the adversary.
The above modelling of dishonest users captures the following scenarios. For verifying secrecy
of doctor/paitent information,
• the dishonest doctor/patient models other doctors/patients that may break secrecy of the
target doctor/patient;
• the dishonest patient/doctor models the patients/doctors that may communicate with the
target doctor/patient;
• the dishonest pharmacist, MPA and HII may participate in the same execution as the target
doctor/patient.
Since secrecy is defined as no other party (including dishonest users) should be able to know a
doctor’s/patient’s information, unless the information is intended to be revealed, we would not
consider it as an attack if the dishonest user intends to receive the private information, for details,
see Section 6.9.1.
For verifying authentication properties, for example, a doctor authenticates a patient, a dis-
honest doctor is not the doctor directly communicating with the patient, and a dishonest patient
is not the one who directly communicates with the doctor, because it does not make sense to
analyse a dishonest user authenticates or authenticates to another user. Instead, the dishonest
doctors and patients are observers who may participate in other execution sessions.
• In general, if user A authenticates to user B, the dishonest users taking the same role of A
or B are observers participating in different sessions, i.e., cannot be A or B.
• For the dishonest pharmacists, MPAs and HIIs, since they are not the authentication parties,
they can be users participating in the same session.
For verifying prescription privacy and receipt-freeness,
• the dishonest doctors are other doctors that aim to break the target doctor’s privacy;
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• the dishonest patients can be patients communicating with the target doctor;
• dishonest pharmacists, MPAs and HIIs can be users participating in the same session.
Note that the dishonest doctor differs from the bribed doctor, as the bribed doctor tries to break
his own privacy, while dishonest doctor tries to break others’ privacy.
For verifying independency of prescription privacy and independency of enforced prescription
privacy,
• the dishonest doctors (not the target doctor) try to break the target doctor’s privacy;
• the dishonest patients may directly communicate with the target doctor;
• the dishonest pharmacists are the same as the bribed pharmacists, since 1) the bribed phar-
macists genuinely forward information to the adversary and 2) all the actions that a dishonest
pharmacists can do can be simulated by the basic DY with the received information from the
bribed pharmacists, i.e., there is no private functions or private channels that the dishonest
pharmacists can use but the adversary with bribed pharmacists information cannot;
• the dishonest MPAs and HIIs can participate in the same session as the target doctor.
The verification with dishonest users shows similar results as the verification without dishonest
users. The reason is that if there is an attack with respect to the basic DY attacker when verifying
a property, then the property is also broken when additionally considering dishonest users. The
exceptions (i.e., the additional identified attacks) are shown in Table 4, and the details of the
additional attacks are shown in the remaining part of this section.
Additional attacks Dishonest users
secrecy of patient tB’s pseudonym basic DY + dishonest patient tA
secrecy of a patient’s pseudonym basic DY + dishonest pharmacists
(strong) patient anonymity when using different HIIs basic DY + dishonest HIIs
(strong) patient anonymity when using different HIIs basic DY + dishonest MPAs
Table 4: Additional attacks when considering dishonest users
6.9.1 Secrecy
When considering dishonest doctors and pharmacists, secrecy results in Table 1 do not change,
since doctors do not receive any information that the adversary does not know (see Figure 7).
When considering dishonest patients, an additional attack is found. When a patient tA is
dishonest, he can obtain another patient tB’s pseudonym by doing the following:
1. tA observes tB’s communication and reads in vc4 (the verifiable encryption which encrypts
tB’s pseudonym with the public key of an MPA).
2. Hence, from vc4, tA can obtain the cipher-text enc(Pnym
B
pt , cpt pkmpa), where Pnym
B
pt is tB’s
pseudonym and cpt pkmpa is the public key of the MPA.
3. tA initiates the protocol with his own data.
4. In the communication with a pharmacist, tA replaces his c5 (which should be a verifiable
encryption, containing a cipher-text from tA encrypted with the public key of the MPA)
with vc4.
5. On receiving vc4 (the fake c5), the pharmacist sends it to the MPA, and the MPA decrypts
the cipher-text enc(PnymBpt , cpt pkmpa), embedded in vc4 and sends the decryption result to
HII.
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6. tA observes the communication between the MPA and HII, and reads the decrypted text of
the fake c5 (i.e., Pnym
B
pt ), which is tB’s pseudonym.
This attack does not exist when the attacker cannot participant as a patient. Because the dishonest
patient has to replace c5 in his own communication. If an hones patient’s c5 is replaced by
the adversary, the pharmacist would detect it by verifying the receipt ReceiptAck , which should
contain the correct c5. This attack can be addressed by explicitly ask the MPA to verify the
decrypted message of c5 to be a verifiable encryption before sending it out. Alternatively, if the
communication between MPA and the HII is secured after authentication, the adversary would
not be able to observe tB’s pseudonym, and thus the attack would not happen.
When considering dishonest pharmacists, an additional attack may exist on a patient’s pseu-
donym. The dishonest pharmacist has/creates a secret key y and obtains its corresponding public
key pk(y). The pharmacist creates a fake MPA identity using the secret key and public key, i.e.,
host(pk(y)). The dishonest pharmacist provides the patient a fake MPA identity, from which the
patient obtains the MPA public key pk(y). Later, the patient encrypts his pseudonym using the
fake MPA’s public key enc(Pnympt , pk(y)), and provides a verifiable encryption, vc4 in particu-
lar. The verifiable encryption is sent to the pharmacist, from which he pharmacist can read the
cipher-text enc(Pnympt , pk(y)). Since the pharmacist knows the secret key y, he can decrypt the
cipher-text and obtains the patient’s pseudonym Pnympt . Note that we model that the patient
obtains the MPA of the pharmacist and the MPA’s public key from the pharmacist, thus the
attack may not happen if the patient initially knows the MPA of any pharmacist, or the patient
has the ability to immediately check whether the MPA provided by a pharmacist is indeed an
legitimate MPA.
When considering dishonest MPAs, the adversary additionally knows a patient’s pseudonym.
However, this can hardly be an attack, as the patient pseudonym is intended to be known by the
MPA. Similarly, the HII is the intended receiver of a patient’s pseudonym. Other than a patient’s
pseudonym, the dishonest MPA and HII do not know any information that the adversary does not
know without controlling dishonest agents. Note that in reality, the MPA and HII may know more
sensitive information, for example, from the pseudonym, the HII is able to obtain the patient’s
identity, and a dishonest MPA can claim that a prescription has medical issues and obtains the
doctor identity in a procedure, which is beyond the scope of this protocol.
6.9.2 Authentication
When considering dishonest users, the verification results of the authentication remain the same,
except the authentication from the dishonest user to other parties. For example, when doctors
are dishonest, we do not need to consider the authentication from doctors to a patient, since the
dishonest users are part of the adversary. Similarly, when a patient is dishonest, the authentication
from a patient to a doctor or a pharmacist is obviously unsatisfied, other authentication verification
results remain the same. When pharmacists, MPAs or HIIs are dishonest, the verification results
remain unchanged.
6.9.3 Privacy properties
For those privacy properties which are not satisfied with respect to the adversary controlling no
dishonest agents, the properties are not satisfied when considering the adversary who controls
dishonest users. Thus, we only need to analyse the property that are satisfied with respect to
the adversary controlling no dishonest agents, i.e. (Strong) patient anonymity. Obviously, two
patients can be distinguished by the adversary who controls dishonest HIIs, when the two patients
use different HIIs, because the patients use different HII public keys to encrypt his pseudonym.
When the two patients use different HIIs, and the HIIs are honest, the adversary, who controls
dishonest MPAs, can still distinguish them, because a patient’s HII is intended to be known by
the MPA. Finally, (strong) patient anonymity is satisfied with respect to the adversary controlling
dishonest doctors and dishonest pharmacists.
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7 Addressing the flaws of the DLV08 protocol
To summarise, we present updates to the assumptions of Section 5.1 to fix the flaws found in our
analysis of the privacy properties.
• s2’ The encryptions are probabilistic.
• s3’ The value of Pnymdr is freshly generated in every session.
• s4’ A doctor freshly generates an unpredictable credential in each session. We model this
with another parameter (a random number) of the credential. Following this, anonymous
authentication using these credentials proves knowledge of the used randomness.
• s4” A patient freshly generates an unpredictable credential in each session. Similar to s4’,
this can be achieved by add randomness in the credential. The anonymous authentication
using the credentials proves the knowledge of the used randomness.
• s5’ The values of Sss differ in sessions.
• s6’ The value of Hii shall be the same for all patients.
The proposed assumptions are provided on the model level. Due to the ambiguities in the original
protocol (e.g., it is not clear how a social security status is represented), it is difficult to propose
detailed solutions. To implement a proposed assumption, one only needs to capture its properties.
To capture s2’, the encryption scheme can be ElGamal cryptosystem, or RSA cryptosystem
with encryption padding, which are probabilistic. In some systems, deterministic encryption, e.g.,
RSA without encryption padding, may be more useful than probabilistic encryption, for example
for database searching of encrypted data. In such systems, designers need to carefully distinguish
which encryption scheme is used in which part of the system.
s3’ can be achieved by directly requiring a doctor’s pseudonym to be fresh in every session,
for example, a doctor generates different pseudonyms in sessions and keeps the authorities, who
maintain the relation between the doctor identity and pseudonyms, updated in a secure way; or
before every session the doctor requests a pseudonym from the authorities. Alternatively, it can
be achieved by changing the value of Pnymdr . Assuming the authorities share a key with each
doctor; instead of directly using pseudonym in a session, the doctor encrypts his pseudonym with
the key using probabilistic encryption. That is, the value of Pnymdr is a cipher-text which differs
in sessions. When an MPA wants to find out the doctor of a prescription, he can contact the
authorities to decrypt the Pnymdr and finds out the pseudonym of the doctor or the identity of the
doctor directly.
s4’ and s4” together form the updates to s4. We separate the update to the doctor credential
in s4’ and the update to the patient credential in s4” for the convenience of referring to them
individually in other places.
Similar to s3’, s5’ can be achieved by directly requiring that a patient’s social security status
is different in each session, e.g., by embedding a timestamp in the status. Alternatively, the value
of Sss can be a cipher-text which is a probabilistic encryption of a patient’s social security status
with the pharmacist’s public key, since the social security status is used for the pharmacist to
check the status of the patient.
s6’ can be achieved by directly requiring that all patients share the same HII. In the case
of multiple HIIs, different HIIs should not be distinguishable, for example, HIIs may cooperate
together and provide a uniformed reference (name and key). In fact, if patients are satisfied
with untraceability within a group of a certain amount of patients, patient untraceability can
be satisfied as long as each HII has more patients than the expected size of the group. If only
untraceability is required (instead of strong untraceability), the use of a group key of all HIIs
is sufficient. The common key among HIIs can be established by using asymmetric group key
agreement. In this way, the HIIs cannot be distinguished by their keys. In addition, the identities
of HIIs are not revealed, and thus cannot be used to distinguish HIIS. Hence, the common key
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checked privacy property initial cause(s) improvement revised
model model
prescription privacy
√ √
prescription privacy w. ID reveal × s4 s4’ √
receipt-freeness × (with s4’ ) s8’ √
ind. of presc. priv.
√
(with s4’)
√
ind. of enf. presc. priv. ×(with s4’) s8’ ×
pt. anonym. (w. ID reveal)
√ √
strong pt. anonym.
√ √
dr. anonym.
√ √
dr. anonym. w. ID reveal × s4 s4’ √
strong dr. anonymity × s4 s4’ √
pt. untrace. (w. ID reveal) × s2, s4, s5, s6 s2’, s4”, s5’, s6’ √
strong pt. untrace. × s2, s4, s5, s6 s2’, s4”, s5’, s6’ √
dr. untrace. × s3 s3’ √
dr. untrace. w. ID reveal × s3,s4 s3’,s4’ √
strong dr. untrace. × s3 s3’ √
Table 5: Verification results of privacy properties and revised assumptions.
ensures that two patients executing the protocol once and one patient executing the protocol twice
cannot be distinguished by their HIIs.
The modified protocol was verified again using ProVerif. The verification results show that
the protocol with revised assumptions satisfies doctor anonymity, strong doctor anonymity, and
prescription privacy, as well as untraceability and strong untraceability for both patient and doctor.
However, the modified protocol model does not satisfy receipt-freeness, to make the protocol
satisfy receipt-freeness, we apply the following assumption on communication channels.
• s8’ Communication channels are untappable (i.e., the adversary does not observe anything
from the channel), except those used for authentication, which remain public.
Our model of the protocol is accordingly modified as follows: replacing channel ch in lines
d10, t6 with an untappable channel chdp, replacing channel ch in lines t23, t26, h5, h22 with
an untappable channel chptph, and replacing channel ch in lines t24, h21 with an untappable
channel chphpt. The untappable channels are modelled as global private channels. We prove that
the protocol (with s4’ and s8’) satisfies receipt-freeness by showing the existence of a process P ′dr
(as shown in Figure 29) such that the equivalences in Definition 4 are satisfied. This was verified
using ProVerif (for verification code, see [DJP12a]).
Messages over untappable channels are assumed to be perfectly secret to the adversary (for
example, the channels assumed in [DKR09, HNB11]). Thus, the security and classical privacy
properties, which are satisfied in the model with public channels only, are also satisfied when
replacing some public channels with untappable channels. Similar to other proposed assumptions,
the assumption of untappable channels is at the model level. This is a strong assumption, as the
implementation of an untappable channel is difficult [HNB11]. However, as this assumption is
often used in literature to achieve privacy in the face of bribery and coercion (e.g. [Oka96, AS02,
HNB11]), we feel that its use here is justifiable.
However, even with the above assumptions the DLV08 protocol does not satisfy independency
of receipt-freeness. The proof first shows that P ′dr is not sufficient for proving this with ProVerif.
Then we prove (analogous to the proof in Section 6.7) that there is no alternative process P ′dr
which satisfies Definition 7. Intuitively, all information sent over untappable channels is received
by pharmacists and can be genuinely revealed to the adversary (no lying assumption). Hence, the
links between a doctor, his nonces, his commitment, his credential and his prescription can still
be revealed when the doctor is bribed/coerced to reveal those nonces.
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initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr{dA/Iddr}) :=
let Iddr = dA in νPnymdr .
(!Pdr (∗the Pdr has assumptions s4’ and s8’∗)
| (out(chc, Iddr ).
out(chc, Pnymdr ).
νndr .out(chc, ndr ).
(∗s4’: creating a nonce and adding it in zk and spk∗)
out(ch, zk((Pnymdr , Iddr , ndr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr , ndr ))).
in(ch, (rcv Authpt , rcv PtProof )).
out(chc, (rcv Authpt , rcv PtProof )).
let c Credpt = getpublic(rcv Authpt) in
let (c Comtpt ,= c Credpt ) = getpublic(rcv PtProof ) in
if Vfy-zkAuthpt (rcv Authpt , c Credpt ) = true then
if Vfy-zkPtProof(rcv PtProof , (c Comtpt , c Credpt )) = true then
out(chc, pA).
νrdr .
out(chc, rdr ).
let PrescriptID = hash(pB, c Comtpt , commit(Pnymdr , rdr )) in
out(chdp, (spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr , ndr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr , ndr )),
(pB,PrescriptID , commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), c Comtpt )),
rdr )).
out(chc, (spk((Pnymdr , rdr , Iddr , ndr ),
(commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), drcred(Pnymdr , Iddr , ndr )),
(pA, hash(pA, c Comtpt , commit(Pnymdr , rdr )),
commit(Pnymdr , rdr ), c Comtpt )),
rdr ))))
Figure 29: The doctor process P ′dr (using untappable channels).
Theorem 2 (independency of receipt-freeness). The DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy independency
of receipt-freeness.
Formal proof the theorem can be found in Appendix B.
Intuitively, a bribed doctor is linked to the nonces he sent to the adversary. The nonces are
linked to the doctor’s prescription in a prescription proof. A doctor’s prescription proof is sent
over untappable channels first to a patient and later from the patient to a pharmacist. Malicious
pharmacists reveal the prescription proof to the adversary. If a bribed doctor lied about his
prescription, the adversary can detect it by checking the doctor’s corresponding prescription proof
revealed by the pharmacist. The untappable channel assumption enables the protocol to satisfy
receipt-freeness but not independency of receipt-freeness because untappable channels enable a
bribed doctor to hide his prescription proof and thus allow the doctor to lie about his prescription,
however the pharmacist gives the prescription proof away, from which the adversary can detect
whether the doctor lied about the prescription.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied security and privacy properties, particular enforced privacy, in the
e-health domain. We identified the requirement that doctor privacy should be enforced to prevent
doctor bribery by, for example, the pharmaceutical industry. To capture this requirement, we
first formalised the classical privacy property, i.e., prescription privacy, and its enforced privacy
counterpart, i.e., receipt-freeness. The cooperation between the bribed doctor and the adversary
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is formalised in the same way as in receipt-freeness in e-voting. However, the formalisation of
receipt-freeness differs from receipt-freeness, due to the domain requirement that only part of the
doctor’s process needs to share information with the adversary.
Next, we noted that e-health systems involve not necessarily trusted third parties, such as
pharmacists. Such parties should not be able to assist an adversary in breaking doctor privacy.
To capture this requirement, we formally defined independency of prescription privacy. Moreover,
this new requirement must hold, even if the doctor is forced to help the adversary. To capture
that, we formally defined independency of receipt-freeness.
These formalisations were validated in a case study of the DLV08 protocol. The protocol was
modelled in the applied pi calculus and verified with the help of the ProVerif tool. In addition
to the (enforced) doctor privacy properties, we also analysed secrecy, authentication, anonymity
and untraceability for both patients and doctors. Ambiguities in the original description of the
protocol which may lead to flaws were found and addressed.
We notice that the property independency of receipt-freeness is not satisfied in the case study
protocol, and we were not able to propose a reasonable fix for it. Thus, it is interesting for us to
design a new protocol to satisfy such strong property in the future. Furthermore, when considering
dishonest users, we did not consider one dishonest user taking multiple roles. Thus, it would be
interesting to analyse the security and privacy properties with respect to dishonest users taking
various combination of roles.
References
[AB05] M. Abadi and B. Blanchet. Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified
Email. Science of Computer Programming, 58(1–2):3–27, 2005.
[ABF07] M. Abadi, B. Blanchet, and C. Fournet. Just fast keying in the pi calculus. ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security, 10(3):1–59, 2007.
[ACdD03] G. Ateniese, R. Curtmola, B. de Medeiros, and D. Davis. Medical information privacy
assurance: cryptographic and system aspects. In Proc. 3rd Conference on Security in
Communication Networks, volume 2576 of LNCS, pages 199–218. Springer, 2003.
[ACRR10] M. Arapinis, T. Chothia, E. Ritter, and M. D. Ryan. Analysing unlinkability and
anonymity using the applied pi calculus. In Proc. 23rd IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, pages 107–121. IEEE CS, 2010.
[Ad02] G. Ateniese and B. de Medeiros. Anonymous e-prescriptions. In Proc. ACM Workshop
on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pages 19–31. ACM Press, 2002.
[AF01] M. Abadi and C. Fournet. Mobile values, new names, and secure communication.
In Proc. 28th Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 104–115.
ACM Press, 2001.
[And96] R. Anderson. A security policy model for clinical information systems. In Proc. 17th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 30–43. IEEE CS, 1996.
[AS02] M. Abe and K. Suzuki. Receipt-free sealed-bid auction. In Proc. 5th Conference on
Information Security, volume 2433 of LNCS, pages 191–199. Springer, 2002.
[BAF08] B. Blanchet, M. Abadi, and C. Fournet. Automated verification of selected equiva-
lences for security protocols. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 75(1):3–51,
2008.
[BB96] Joachim Biskup and Gerrit Bleumer. Cryptographic protection of health information:
cost and benefit. International Journal of Bio-Medical Computing, 43(1):61–67, 1996.
57
[BC08] B. Blanchet and A. Chaudhuri. Automated formal analysis of a protocol for secure
file sharing on untrusted storage. In Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 417–431. IEEE CS, 2008.
[BCKL08] M. Belenkiy, M. Chase, M. Kohlweiss, and A. Lysyanskaya. P-signatures and non-
interactive anonymous credentials. In Proc. 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference,
volume 4948 of LNCS, pages 356–374. Springer, 2008.
[BHM08] M. Backes, C. Hrit¸cu, and M. Maffei. Automated verification of remote electronic
voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus. In Proc. 21st IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, pages 195–209. IEEE CS, 2008.
[Bla] B. Blanchet. Proverif automatic cryptographic protocol verifier user manual for un-
typed inputs. October 1, 2012.
[Bla01] B. Blanchet. An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. In
Proc. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 82–96. IEEE CS,
2001.
[Bla02] B. Blanchet. From secrecy to authenticity in security protocols. In Proc. 9th Interna-
tional Symposium on Static Analysis, volume 2477 of LNCS, pages 342–359. Springer,
2002.
[Bla04] B. Blanchet. Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols. In Proc. 25th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 86–100. IEEE CS, 2004.
[Bla09] B. Blanchet. Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols. Journal
of Computer Security, 17(4):363–434, 2009.
[BMU08] M. Backes, M. Maffei, and D. Unruh. Zero-knowledge in the applied pi-calculus and
automated verification of the direct anonymous attestation protocol. In Proc. IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 202–215. IEEE CS, 2008.
[Bra00] S. A. Brands. Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certificates: building
in privacy. MIT Press, 2000.
[BT94] J. Benaloh and D. Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract).
In Proc. 26th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 544–553. ACM Press,
1994.
[CHCK07] D. K. W. Chiu, P. C. K. Hung, V. S. Y. Cheng, and E. Kafeza. Protecting the
exchange of medical images in healthcare process integration with web services. In
Proc. 40th Hawaii Conference on Systems Science, pages 131–140. IEEE CS, 2007.
[CKS04] R. Chadha, S. Kremer, and A. Scedrov. Formal analysis of multi-party contract
signing. In Proc. 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 266–
279. IEEE CS, 2004.
[dDLVV08] B. de Decker, M. Layouni, H. Vangheluwe, and K. Verslype. A privacy-preserving
eHealth protocol compliant with the Belgian healthcare system. In Proc. 5th European
Workshop on Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Application, volume 5057 of
LNCS, pages 118–133. Springer, 2008.
[DJP11] N. Dong, H. L. Jonker, and J. Pang. Analysis of a receipt-free auction protocol in the
applied pi calculus. In Proc. 7th Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust,
volume 6561 of LNCS, pages 223–238. Springer, 2011.
58
[DJP12a] N. Dong, H. L. Jonker, and J. Pang. Formal analysis of an eHealth pro-
tocol [proverif codes]. Technical report, University of Luxembourg, 2012.
ProVerif codes are available at http://satoss.uni.lu/naipeng/publication.php
or http://satoss.uni.lu/members/naipeng/thesis.php.
[DJP12b] N. Dong, H. L. Jonker, and J. Pang. Formal analysis of privacy in an eHealth protocol.
In Proc. 17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 7459
of LNCS, pages 325–342. Springer, 2012.
[DJP13] N. Dong, H. L. Jonker, and J. Pang. Enforcing privacy in the presence of others:
Notions, formalisations and relations. In Proc. 18th European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security, volume 8134 of LNCS, pages 499–516. Springer, 2013.
[DKR09] S. Delaune, S. Kremer, and M. D. Ryan. Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic
voting protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 17(4):435–487, 2009.
[DY83] D. Dolev and A. C.-C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, 29(2):198–207, 1983.
[HNB11] J. Howlader, V. Nair, and S. Basu. Deniable encryption in replacement of untap-
pable channel to prevent coercion. In Advances in Networks and Communications,
volume 132 of Communications in Computer and Information Science, pages 491–501.
Springer, 2011.
[Hor51] A. Horn. On sentences which are true of direct unions of algebras. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 16(1):14–21, 1951.
[HS00] M. Hirt and K. Sako. Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption.
In Proc. 19th Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques,
volume 1807 of LNCS, pages 539–556. Springer, 2000.
[JPM09] H. L. Jonker, J. Pang, and S. Mauw. A formal framework for quantifying voter-
controlled privacy. Journal of Algorithms in Cognition, Informatics and Logic, 64(2-
3):89–105, 2009.
[KAB09] D. Kotz, S. Avancha, and A. Baxi. A privacy framework for mobile health and home-
care systems. In Proc. Workshop on Security and Privacy in Medical and Home-Care
Systems, pages 1–12. ACM Press, 2009.
[KBM+03] A. Kalam, S. Benferhat, A. Mie`ge, R. Baida, F. Cuppens, C. Saurel, P. Balbiani,
Y. Deswarte, and G. Trouessin. Organization based access control. In Proc. 4th IEEE
Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, pages 120–131. IEEE
CS, 2003.
[KLS+10] J. Ko, C. Lu, M. B. Srivastava, J. A. Stankovic, A. Terzis, and M. Welsh. Wireless
sensor networks for healthcare. Proceedings of IEEE, 98(11):1947–1960, 2010.
[KT09] R. Ku¨sters and T. Truderung. An epistemic approach to coercion-resistance for elec-
tronic voting protocols. In Proc. 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 251–266. IEEE CS, 2009.
[KTV10] R. Ku¨sters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. A game-based definition of coercion-resistance
and its applications. In Proc. 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium,
pages 122–136. IEEE CS, 2010.
[LCPD07] L. Luo, X. Cai, J. Pang, and Y. Deng. Analyzing an electronic cash protocol using
applied pi-calculus. In Proc. 5th Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network
Security, volume 4521 of LNCS, pages 87–103. Springer, 2007.
59
[Liu11] J. Liu. A proof of coincidence of labeled bisimilarity and observational equivalence in
applied pi calculus, 2011. Available at http://lcs.ios.ac.cn/~jliu/.
[LK00] B. Lee and K. Kim. Receipt-free electronic voting through collaboration of voter and
honest verifier, 2000.
[LK02] B. Lee and K. Kim. Receipt-free electronic voting with a tamper-resistant randomizer.
In Proc. 4th Conference on Information and Communications Security, volume 2513
of LNCS, pages 389–406. Springer, 2002.
[Lou98] K. Louwerse. The electronic patient record; the management of access – case study:
Leiden university hospital. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 49(1):39–44,
1998.
[Low96] G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR.
In Proc. 2nd Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis
of Systems, volume 1055 of LNCS, pages 147–166. Springer, 1996.
[LVS+09] M. Layouni, K. Verslype, M. T. Sandikkaya, B. de Decker, and H. Vangheluwe.
Privacy-preserving telemonitoring for eHealth. In Proc. 23rd Annual IFIP Working
Conference on Data and Applications Security, volume 5645 of LNCS, pages 95–110.
Springer, 2009.
[Mat98] V. Matya´sˇ. Protecting doctors’ identity in drug prescription analysis, 1998.
[MB01] Sjouke Mauw and Victor Bos. Drawing Message Sequence Charts with LATEX. TUG-
Boat, 22(1-2):87–92, March/June 2001.
[MKDH09] I. Maglogiannis, L. Kazatzopoulos, C. Delakouridis, and S. Hadjiefthymiades. En-
abling location privacy and medical data encryption in patient telemonitoring sys-
tems. IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Biomedicine, 13(6):946–954,
2009.
[MRS06] M. Meingast, T. Roosta, and S. S. Sastry. Security and privacy issues with health care
information technology. In Proc. 28th Annual Conference of the IEEE Engineering in
Medicine and Biology Society, pages 5453–5458. IEEE CS, 2006.
[Oka96] T. Okamoto. An electronic voting scheme. In Proc. IFIP World Conference on IT
Tools, pages 21–30, 1996.
[RCHS03] J. Reid, I. Cheong, M. Henricksen, and J. Smith. A novel use of rBAC to protect
privacy in distributed health care information systems. In Proc. 8th Australian Con-
ference on Information Security and Privacy, volume 2727 of LNCS, pages 403–415.
Springer, 2003.
[RS10] M. D. Ryan and B. Smyth. Applied pi calculus. Technical re-
port, School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, 2010.
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/research/papers/pdf/11-applied-pi.extended.pdf.
[SS96] S. Schneider and A. Sidiropoulos. CSP and anonymity. In Proc. 4th European Sym-
posium on Research in Computer Security, volume 1146 of LNCS, pages 198–218.
Springer, 1996.
[SV09] S. Sneha and U. Varshney. Enabling ubiquitous patient monitoring: Model, decision
protocols, opportunities and challenges. Decision Support Systems, 46(3):606–619,
2009.
[TGC09] J. M. Tien and P. Goldschmidt-Clermont. Healthcare: A complex service system.
Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, 18(3):257–282, 2009.
60
[vMR08] T. van Deursen, S. Mauw, and S. Radomirovic´. Untraceability of RFID protocols. In
Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices,
Convergence and Next Generation, volume 5019 of LNCS, pages 1–15. Springer, 2008.
[vWB+03] M. van der Haak, A. C. Wolff, R. Brandner, P. Drings, M.Wannenmacher, and T. Wet-
ter. Data security and protection in cross-institutional electronic patient records.
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 70(2-3):117–130, 2003.
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 (receipt-freeness). The DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy receipt-freeness under both
the standard assumption s4 (a doctor has the same credential in every session), and also under
assumption s4’ (a doctor generates a new credential for each session).
It is obvious that the DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy receipt-freeness under assumption s4 (a
doctor has the same credential in every session), since DLV08 does not even satisfy prescription
privacy with assumption s4. The reasoning is as follows: since the adversary can link a prescription
to a doctor without additional information from the bribed doctor, he can also link a prescription
to a doctor when he has additional information from the bribed doctor. Therefore, the adversary
can always tell whether a bribed doctor lied.
Next we prove that the DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy receipt-freeness under assumption s4’
(a doctor generates a new credential for each session). That is to prove that there exists no
indistinguishable process in which the doctor lies to the adversary. To do so, we assume that there
exists such a process P ′dr which satisfies the definition of receipt-freeness, and then derive some
contradiction. In generic terms, the proof runs as follows: a bribed doctor reveals the nonces used
in the commitment and the credential to the adversary. This allows the adversary to link a bribed
doctor to his commitment and credential. In the prescription proof, a prescription is linked to a
doctor’s commitment and credential. Suppose there exists a process P ′dr in which the doctor lies
to the adversary that he prescribed pA, while the adversary observes that the commitment or the
credential is linked to pB. The adversary can detect that the doctor has lied.
Proof. Assume there exist process init ′dr and P
′
dr , so that the two equivalences in the definition
of receipt-freeness are satisfied, i.e., ∃ init ′dr and P ′dr satisfying
1. Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]; and
2. Ceh [
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
].
According to the definition of labelled bisimilarity (Definition 2), if process A can reach A′
(A
α∗−−→ A′) and A ≈ℓ B, then B can reach B′ (B α∗−−→ B′) and A′ ≈ℓ B′. Vice versa. Note that we
use
α∗−−→ to denote one or more internal and/or labelled reductions.
According to Definition 2, if A′ ≈ℓ B′ then A′ ≈s B′.
According to the definition of static equivalence (Definition 1), if two processes are static equiv-
alent A′ ≈s B′, then frame(A′) ≈s frame(B′). Thus we have that ∀M,N , (M =E N)frame(A′) iff
(M =E N)frame(B
′).
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Let A be the right-hand side of the first equivalence and B be the left-hand side, i.e.,
A = Ceh [
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
B = Ceh [
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
].
On the right-hand side of the first equivalence (process A), there exists an output of a prescrip-
tion proof PrescProof r (together with the open information of the doctor commitment rrdr ), over
public channels, from the process (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc initiated by doctor dA. Formally,
A
α∗−−→ Ai = Ci[out(ch, (PrescProof r , rrdr ))] ≡ νx.(Ci[out(ch, x)] | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x})
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ Ci[0] | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}. Let A′′ = Ci[0], we have A α∗−−→
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ A′′ |
{(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}. Let A′ = A′′ | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}, we have A α∗−−→
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ A′.
Since A ≈ℓ B, we have that B α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ B′ and A′ ≈ℓ B′. Hence, A′ ≈s B′ and thus
frame(A′) ≈s frame(B′). Since frame(A′) = frame(A′′) | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}, the adversary
can obtain the prescription pA: pA = first(getmsg(first(x))), where function first returns the first
element of a tuple or a pair. Since frame(A′) ≈s frame(B′), we should have the same relation
pA = first(getmsg(first(x))) in frame(B
′).
Intuitively, since on the right-hand side, the adversary can obtain the prescription pA from
PrescProof r , due to (pA,PrescriptID
r,Comtrdr , c Comt
r
pt ) = getmsg(PrescProof
r ), on the left-
hand side of the first equivalence, there should also exist an output of a prescription proof
PrescProof l over public channels, from which the adversary can obtain a prescription pA, fol-
lowing the same relation:
(pA,PrescriptID
l,Comt ldr , c Comt
l
pt ) = getmsg(PrescProof
l).
Next, we prove that the corresponding prescription proof PrescProof l is indeed the prescrip-
tion proof in the doctor sub-process init ′dr or P
′
dr in process B, rather than other sub-processes.
Formally, the action
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ in process B happens in sub-process init ′dr or P ′dr .
On the right-hand side (process A), the doctor pseudonym Pnymrdr and the nonce for doctor
commitment rrdr and the nonce for doctor credential n
r
dr (used for assumption s4’) are revealed
to the adversary on chc channel. Formally,
A
α∗−−→ νx1.out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−→ A1 | {Pnymrdr/x1}
α∗−−→ νx2.out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−→ A2 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2}
α∗−−→ νx3.out(chc,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→ A3 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2} | {nrdr/x3}
α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ A4 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2} | {nrdr/x3} | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x} ≡ A′.
Since A ≈ℓ B, we have that
B
α∗−−→ νx1.out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−→ B1 | {Pnymldr/x1}
α∗−−→ νx2.out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−→ B2 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2}
α∗−−→ νx3.out(chc,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→ B3 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2} | {nldr/x3}
α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ B4 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2} | {nldr/x3} | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x} ≡ B′.
That is, on the left-hand side of the first equivalence, to be equivalent to the right-hand side, there
also exist sub-processes which output messages on chc channel. Such sub-processes can only be
init ′dr and P
′
dr , because there is no output on chc in other sub-processes in the left-hand side
process (process B).
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In frame(A′) = frame(A4) | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2} | {nrdr/x3} | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}, we
have the following relation between two terms,
first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dA, x3),
(commit(x1, x2), drcred(x1, dA, x3)),
(pA,PrescriptID
r, commit(x1, x2), c Comt
r
pt )).
Since A′ ≈s B′, we should have the same relation in frame(B′).
first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dA, x3),
(commit(x1, x2), drcred(x1, dA, x3)),
(pA,PrescriptID
l, commit(x1, x2), c Comt
l
pt )).
On the left-hand side (process B), the terms sent by process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr over chc – the
doctor pseudonym and the nonces Pnymldr , r
l
dr and n
l
dr (corresponding to Pnym
r
dr , r
r
dr and n
r
dr on
the right-hand side), are essential to compute PrescProof l. Thus, process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr is able
to compute and thus output the prescription proof PrescProof l, given that the coerced doctor dA
has the knowledge of pA, by applying the following function:
PrescProof l = spk((Pnymldr , r
l
dr , dA, n
l
dr ),
(commit(Pnymldr , r
l
dr ), drcred(Pnym
l
dr , dA, n
l
dr )),
(pA,PrescriptID
l, commit(Pnymldr , r
l
dr ), c Comt
l
pt ).
Now we have proved that the action of revealing (PrescProof l, rldr ) (
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→) can be taken
in process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr in process B. Next we show that sub-processes except init
′
dr and
P ′dr in B, cannot take the action of revealing (PrescProof
l, rldr ), given the process init
′
dr and P
′
dr
does not replay the message (PrescProof l, rldr ) in an honest doctor process.
By examining process B, the sub-processes which send out a pair, the first element of which
is a signed proof of knowledge, can only be doctor processes and the MPA processes, i.e., sub-
processes that may send out a message x potentially satisfying pA = first(getmsg(first(x))) can only
be doctor processes (at d10) or MPA processes (at m30).
• Case 1: considering that message x should also satisfy open(third(getmsg(first(x))), snd(x)) =
Pnymldr , the processes revealing x can only be doctor processes, because the second element
in the message sent out at line m30 of an MPA process is a zero-knowledge proof, and thus
cannot be used as a nonce to open a commitment third(getmsg(first(x))).
• Case 2: considering that the message x should satisfy first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dA, x3),
(commit(x1, x2),drcred(x1, dA, x3)),(pA,PrescriptID
l,commit(x1, x2), c Comt
l
pt )), where x1 is
the doctor pseudonym, x2 and x3 are nonces, and the adversary receive x1, x2, x3 from chc
channel, doctor sub-processes (except init ′dr and P
′
dr ) cannot reveal the message x. Because
these doctor sub-processes model honest doctor sessions, and thus use their own generated
nonces to compute the signed proofs of knowledge (at line t23). Such nonces are not sent
to the adversary over chc channel, since these doctor processes are not bribed or coerced.
Thus, the signed proofs of knowledge generated by these honest doctor prepossess cannot
be the first element of the message x, unless the process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr reuses one of the
signed proofs of knowledge.
In the case that the process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr replay the message (PrescProof
l, rldr ) of an
honest doctor process, x1 needs to be the corresponding doctor pseudonym, and x2 and x3 need
to be the corresponding nonces for the reused signed proof of knowledge the message. Other-
wise, (PrescProof l, rldr ) will be detected as a fake message. Thus, the message indeed represents
the actual prescription in process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr . Although the action of revealing message
(PrescProof l, rldr ) may be taken in an honest doctor process, the same action will be eventually
taken in process init ′dr or P
′
dr .
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Therefore, the process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr indeed outputs the prescription proof PrescProof
l on
the left-hand side of the first equivalence, i.e., init ′dr/P
′
dr
α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ P | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x}.
Let C be the left-hand side of the second equivalence, and D be the right-hand side.
C = Ceh [
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
D = Ceh [
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
In processC, the sub-process initdr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )\out(chc,·) := νchc.(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} |
P ′dr ) |!in(chc, y)), according to the definition of P\out(chc,·). Since init ′dr/P ′dr may take the action
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ where {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x}, we have init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ) α∗−−→
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→
P ′ | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x}. By filling it in the context νchc.( |!in(chc, y)), we have νchc.((init ′dr .
(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ) |!in(chc, y)) α∗−−→
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ νchc.((P ′ | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x}) |!in(chc, y)),
and thus (init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )\out(chc,·) α∗−−→
νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ νchc.(P ′ | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x} |
!in(chc, y)). The sub-process maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}) also outputs a signed proof of knowl-
edge from which the adversary obtains pA, i.e., maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}) α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ C1 |
{(PrescProof , rdr )/x1} and pA = first(getmsg(first(x1))). Thus, in process C, there are two out-
puts of a signed proof of knowledge, from which the adversary obtains pA. Other signed proofs of
knowledge will not lead to pA or pB, as the prescription in process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr}
are freshly generated.
In process D, the sub-process maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc} outputs a prescription proof from
which the adversary knows pB, sub-processmaindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc} outputs a prescription proof
from which the adversary knows pA, the prescriptions from the sub-process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and
!Pdr{dA/Iddr} are fresh names and thus cannot be pA or pB. The adversary can detect that the
process C and D are not equivalent: in process C, the adversary obtains two pA, and in process
D, the adversary obtains one pA and one pB. This contradicts the assumption that C ≈ℓ D.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (independency of receipt-freeness). The DLV08 protocol fails to satisfy independency
of receipt-freeness.
Proof. Assume the DLV08 protocol satisfies independency of receipt-freeness. That is, ∃ init ′dr and
P ′dr satisfying the following two equivalences in the definition of independency of receipt-freeness
(Definition 7).
1. Ceh [!Rchcph |
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Rchcph |
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.
(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]; and
2. Ceh [!Rchci |
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
≈ℓ Ceh [!Rchci |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
].
We prove that this assumption leads to contradictions.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, according to the definition of labelled bisimilarity (Defini-
tion 2) and static equivalence (Definition 1), Given A ≈ℓ B, if A α∗−−→ A′ and M =E N frame(A′),
then B
α∗−−→ B′ and M =E N frame(B′). Vice versa.
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Let A be the right-hand side of the first equivalence, B be the left-hand side.
A = Ceh [!Rchcph |
(
(initdr{dA/Iddr})chc.
(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc})
)
]
B = Ceh [!Rchcph |
(
init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr )
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
In process A, the doctor dA computed a signed proof of knowledge PrescProof
r in the sub-
process (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc. The signed proof of knowledge is sent to a patient over
private channel. In addition, the signed proof of knowledge is also sent to the adversary over
chc together with a nonce (the message sent over chc is (PrescProof r , rrdr )). On receiving the
signed proof of knowledge, the patient sends it together with other information to a pharma-
cist over a private channel. On receiving the message from the patient over private channel,
the pharmacist forwards the message to the adversary over chc (the message sent over chc is
(PrescProof r ,PtSpk r , vcr1, vc
r
2, vc
r
3, vc
r′
3 , vc
r
4, c
r
5)). Another sub-processmaindr{dB/Iddr , pB/presc}
also generates a signed proof of knowledge PrescProof zr . This signed proof of knowledge is sent
to a patient in a message over private channel (but it is not sent to the adversary over chc, as this
sub-process is not bribed or coerced), and then sent to a pharmacist in another message via private
channel. Finally, the pharmacist, who receives the message containing PrescProof zr , sends the
message to the adversary over channel chc (the message sent to chc is (PrescProof zr ,PtSpk zr , vczr1 ,
vczr2 , vc
zr
3 , vc
zr′
3 , vc
zr
4 , c
zr
5 )). Formally, there is a trace in process A as follows.
A
α∗−−→ νx.out(chc,x)−−−−−−−−→ A1 | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x}
α∗−−→ νy.out(chc,y)−−−−−−−−→ A2 | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x} |
{(PrescProof r ,PtSpk r , vcr1 , vcr2 , vcr3 , vcr
′
3 , vc
r
4 , c
r
5 )/y}
α∗−−→ νz.out(chc,z)−−−−−−−−→ A3 | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x} |
{(PrescProof r ,PtSpk r , vcr1 , vcr2 , vcr3 , vcr
′
3 , vc
r
4 , c
r
5 )/y} |
{(PrescProof zr ,PtSpk zr , vczr1 , vczr2 , vczr3 , vczr
′
3 , vc
zr
4 , c
zr
5 )/z}
Let A′ = A3 | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x} | {(PrescProof r ,PtSpk r , vcr1 , vcr2 , vcr3 , vcr
′
3 , vc
r
4 , c
r
5 )/y} |
{(PrescProof zr ,PtSpk zr , vczr1 , vczr2 , vczr3 , vczr
′
3 , vc
zr
4 , c
zr
5 )/z}. We have pA = first(getmsg(first(x))) =
first(getmsg(first(y))) and pB = first(getmsg(first(z))) at frame frame(A
′).
Since A ≈ℓ B, we should have that
B
α∗−−→ νx.out(chc,x)−−−−−−−−→ B1 | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x}
α∗−−→ νy.out(chc,y)−−−−−−−−→ B2 | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x} |
{(PrescProof l ,PtSpk l , vcl1 , vcl2 , vcl3 , vcl
′
3 , vc
l
4 , c
l
5 )/y} |
α∗−−→ νz.out(chc,z)−−−−−−−−→ B3 | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x} |
{(PrescProof l ,PtSpk l , vcl1 , vcl2 , vcl3 , vcl
′
3 , vc
l
4 , c
l
5 )/y} |
{(PrescProof zl ,PtSpk zl , vczl1 , vczl2 , vczl3 , vczl
′
3 , vc
zl
4 , c
zl
5 )/z}.
Let B′ = B3 | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x} | {(PrescProof l ,PtSpk l , vcl1 , vcl2 , vcl3 , vcl
′
3 , vc
l
4 , c
l
5 )/y} |
{(PrescProof zl ,PtSpk zl , vczl1 , vczl2 , vczl3 , vczl
′
3 , vc
zl
4 , c
zl
5 )/z}. We should have A′ ≈ℓ B′, and thus,
pA = first(getmsg(first(x))) = first(getmsg(first(y))) and pB = first(getmsg(first(z))) at frame
frame(B′).
In process B, the sub-process maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc} generates a signed proof of knowl-
edge f and pA = first(getmsg(f)). This signed proof of knowledge will be eventually revealed
by a pharmacist, B
α∗−−→ νh.out(chc,h)−−−−−−−−→ B4 | {(f ,PtSpk f , vcf1 , vcf2 , vcf3 , vcf
′
3 , vc
f
4 , c
f
5 )/h} and pA =
first(getmsg(first(h))) = first(getmsg(f)).
By examining process B, we observe that y = h. The reason is as follows: since pA =
first(getmsg(first(y))), sub-process !Pdr{dB/Iddr} generate fresh prescriptions and thus cannot be
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pA, therefore, !Pdr{dB/Iddr} does not generate a prescription which eventually leads to the action of
sending y. Thus the possible sub-process which generates the prescription pA and potentially leads
to sending y can only be init ′dr , P
′
dr or maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}. Assume init ′dr or P ′dr generates
prescription pA which leads to the action of sending y and y 6= h, then, the adversary obtains three
pA in process B: one from pA = first(getmsg(first(h))), one from pA = first(getmsg(first(y))), and
one from pA = first(getmsg(first(x))). However, in process A, the adversary can only observe two
pA: one from pA = first(getmsg(first(x))) and one from pA = first(getmsg(first(y))). This contradicts
the assumption that A ≈ℓ B. Therefore, the prescription pA which leads to the action of revealing
y is generated in sub-process maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}, and thus y = h.
In addition, in process B, we observe that the prescription pB is generated in process init
′
dr
or P ′dr . As sub-process !Pdr{dB/Iddr} generates fresh prescriptions and thus cannot be pB, and
sub-process maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc} generates pA (pA 6= pB), the only sub-process can generate
pB is init
′
dr or P
′
dr . The second equivalence also confirms this observation. Let C be the left-hand
side of the second equivalence, and D be the right-hand side.
C = Ceh [!Rchci |
(
(init ′dr .(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | P ′dr ))\out(chc,·)
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
]
D = Ceh [!Rchci |
(
initdr{dA/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dA/Iddr} | maindr{dA/Iddr , pB/presc})
) |(
initdr{dB/Iddr}.(!Pdr{dB/Iddr} | maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc})
)
].
In process D, the adversary can obtain one pA and one pB. Since C ≈ℓ D, in process D, the
adversary should also obtain one pA and one pB. Since sub-process maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}
generates pA and sub-process !Pdr{dA/Iddr} and !Pdr{dB/Iddr} cannot generates pB, it must be
process init ′dr or P
′
dr who generates pB.
As the generated pB in process init
′
dr or P
′
dr is first sent to patient, then sent to a pharmacist
and thus leads to a message sending over chc. The message revealed by the pharmacist is z,
because pB = first(getmsg(first(z))), and on other process can generate pB in process B.
By examining process B, the only sub-process which can take the action of sending x is
process init ′dr or P
′
dr , as process !R
chc
ph does not send a message x which is a pair and thus satisfies
x = pair(first(x), snd(x)), and other processes does not involving using channel chc.
Intuitively, in process B, sub-process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr sends pB to the patient which leads to
the action of sending z; meanwhile, the sub-process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr lies to the adversary that
the singed proof of knowledge for prescription is PrescProof l by sending x.
In process A, in addition to PrescProof r , process (maindr{dA/Iddr , pA/presc})chc also sends
other information over channel chc. Formally,
A
α∗−−→ νx1.out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−→ A1 | {Pnymrdr/x1}
α∗−−→ νx2.out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−→ A2 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2}
α∗−−→ νx3.out(chc,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→ A3 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2} | {nrdr/x3}
α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ A1 | {Pnymrdr/x1} | {rrdr/x2} | {nrdr/x3} | {(PrescProof r , rrdr )/x},
and x1, x2, x3 and x satisfy
first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dA, x3),
(commit(x1, x2), drcred(x1, dA, x3)),
(pA, snd(getmsg(first(x))), commit(x1, x2), fourth(getmsg(first(x))))).
Since A ≈ℓ B, we should have that
B
α∗−−→ νx1.out(chc,x1)−−−−−−−−−−→ B1 | {Pnymldr/x1}
α∗−−→ νx2.out(chc,x2)−−−−−−−−−−→ B2 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2}
α∗−−→ νx3.out(chc,x3)−−−−−−−−−−→ B3 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2} | {nldr/x3}
α∗−−→ νx.out(ch,x)−−−−−−−−→ B1 | {Pnymldr/x1} | {rldr/x2} | {nldr/x3} | {(PrescProof l , rldr )/x},
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and the same relation holds between x1, x2, x3 and x,
first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dA, x3),
(commit(x1, x2), drcred(x1, dA, x3)),
(pA, snd(getmsg(first(x))), commit(x1, x2), fourth(getmsg(first(x))))).
(eq1)
The sub-process init ′dr and P
′
dr do not know Pnym
l
dr , n
l
dr since the two information satisfies
secrecy. Thus sub-process init ′dr and/or P
′
dr cannot send x1 and x3 over chc channel. Even
assume the process init ′dr and P
′
dr know the private information Pnym
l
dr , r
l
dr , n
l
dr for constructing
PrescProof l, since PrescProof l is actually generated by maindr{dB/Iddr , pA/presc}, we have the
following relation:
f = PrescProof l = spk((Pnymldr , r
l
dr , dB, n
l
dr ),
(commit(Pnymldr , r
l
dr ), drcred(Pnym
l
dr , dB, n
l
dr )),
(pA,PrescriptID
l, commit(Pnymldr , r
l
dr ), c Comt
l
pt ).
that is,
first(x) = spk((x1, x2, dB, x3),
(commit(x1, x2), drcred(x1, dB, x3)),
(pA, snd(getmsg(first(x))), commit(x1, x2), fourth(getmsg(first(x))))).
(eq2)
and thus, the adversary can detect that PrescProof l is generated by dB by telling the difference
between (eq1) and (eq2). This contradicts the assumption that A ≈ℓ B.
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